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PROGRESS IN INTERSTATE ADJUSTMENT OF THE PLACE
OF TRIAL OF CIVIL ACTIONS: II*
Actions against Government Corporations. The increasing use of govern-
ment corporations as a convenient means of exercising certain federal func-
tions presents new problems in interstate adjustment.92 Congress could settle
the problem by definitely fixing the forum for actions involving government
corporations, as it did in the National Banking Act, which provides that
National Banks shall sue and be sued in the state or federal courts of their
location.93 But in the absence of such provision, since these corporations were
* For the first installment of this Comment, see (1936) 45 YAr. L. J. 110D.
92. See generally Culp, Creation of Government Corporations by the National Govern-
ment (1935) 33 MAcn. L. Rxv. 473; Field, Government Corporations, A Proposal (1935)
48 HAv. L. Rv. 775; Thurston, Government Proprietary Corporations (1935) 21 VA. L.
RPv. 351, 465; VAw DORN, Govnuamsw' Owxam CoRpo=Riows (1926); Comment (1935)
20 ST. Louis L. R v. 229.
93. 18 STAT. 320 (1875), 12 U. S. C. A. § 94 (1926). But this provision has been held
not to be exclusive. Curlee v. Nat. Bank of Fayetteville, 187 N. C. 119, 121 S. E. 194
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early denied the facile plea of sovereign immunity,0 4 the question is simply
whether the state statutes with respect to service and jurisdiction are applicable.
It is unlikely that the legislatures in passing these statutes had government
corporations in mind. Yet this should not serve to except them from the oper-
ation of such acts, for, regardless of whether or not they may properly be termed
"foreign corporations,"0 5 they do come within the category of corporations not
chartered in the state, and Congress has sought to clothe these bodies with all
the attributes of private corporations. Their inclusion in such acts, moreover,
would seem preferable in that it would avoid harshly limiting the plaintiff's
right of suit to the state of the corporation's home office, the only place where
he could secure service on its officials without the corporation's consent. 0
(1924). Contra: Cadle v. Tracy, 4 Fed. Cas. No. 2,279, p. 967 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1873)
(garnishment process).
94. Bank of the U. S. v. Planters' Bank of Ga., 9 Wheat. 904 (U. S. 1824); Sloan
Shipyards Corp. v. U. S. Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 549 (1922) (D. C.
corp.); Olson v. U. S. Spruce Production Corp., 267 U. S. 462 (1925) (Wash. corp.);
Panama Rr. Co. v. Minnix, 282 Fed. 47 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922) (tort). They may also
be garnisheed. Commonwealth Finance Co. v. Landis, 261 Fed. 440 (E. D. Pa. 1919);
Haines v. Lone Star Shipbuilding Co., 268 Pa. 92, 110 Al. 788 (1920). Contra: McCarthy
v. U. S. Shipping Bd. Merchant Fleet Corp., 53 F. (2d) 923 (App. D. C. 1931), cort.
denied, 285 U. S. 547 (1932).
95. The cases are not easily reconcilable on this point, but in general, corporations
created directly by act of Congress in its capacity as a national legislature arc not con.
sidered foreign corporations in the states. Commonwealth v. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 98
Pa. 90 (1881) (for purpose of license tax); Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Weatherby, 41 Tex,
Civ. App. 409, 92 S. W. 58 (1906). Contra: Smith v. Pac. Rr. Co., 61 Mo. 17 (1375)
(prohibition against leasing local railroad). Such corporations are sometimes considered
domestic corporations in states where they are doing business. Mooney v. Union Pae. Ry.
Co., 60 Iowa 346, 14 N. W. 343 (1882) (garnishment); Gold v. Tex. & Pac. Rr. Co., 176
App. Div. 818, 163 N. Y. Supp. 479 (1st Dep't, 1917). But cf. Bankers' Trust Co. v.
Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 241 U. S. 295 (1916) (denied attribute of federal diversity citizenship).
Corporations so created, however, which are given fixed domicils in their charters are
considered foreign corporations in other states. Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. Prlddy,
295 U. S. 229 (1935) (for purpose of attachment); so with National Banks: Beckham v,
Hague, 44 App. Div. 146, 60 N. Y. Supp. 767 (1st Dep't, 1899) (giving security for costs
in suits); In re Cushing's Estate, 40 Misc. 505, 82 N. Y. Supp. 795 (Surr. Ct. 1903)
(taxation). Contra: Van Dresser v. Ore. Ry. & Navig. Co., 48 Fed. 202 (C. C. D. Wash.
1891) (for purpose of suit); cf. Fisher v. First Trust joint-Stock Land Bank of Chicago,
210 Iowa 531, 231 N. W. 671, 69 A. L. R. 1346 (1930) (neither foreign, nor domestic
for purpose of domiciliary jurisdiction). And corporations created by Congress merely
by virtue of its authority to legislate for the District of Columbia or the territories are
foreign corporations in states and territories other than those of their creation. Adams
Exp. Co. v. Denver & R. G. W. Ry. Co., 16 Fed. 712 (C. C. D. Colo. 1883) (territorial
charter); Cory v. State, 55 Ga. 236 (1875) (corporation created directly by Congrets as
legislature for District of Columbia); State v. Briggs, 116 Ind. 55, 18 N. E. 395 (1888)
(D. C. corp.). As to government corporations chartered in the states, see note 101, infra.
96. Their exclusion would likewise preclude suit in the federal courts of the state on
diversity grounds; and there is no federal question by virtue of government ownership




Despite these considerations, however, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
has recently held that a statute authorizing substituted service on the Secretary
of State in actions against foreign corporations in the absence of an express
appointment of a process agent was inapplicable to a corporation organized under
the Federal Farm Loan Act,9 7 since such a corporation derived its right to do
business in the state not from any express or implied license of the state, but
solely from the federal act.98 The court, however, overlooked the perfect analo-
gies of corporations engaged in interstate commerce or the federal employ, which
are not exempt from state service statutes, although they are no less immune
from exclusion by the states.99 In any event, this decision is no authority for
a similar holding with respect to government corporations which are not created
directly by act of Congress, but are chartered under the general incorporation
laws of the District of Columbiaoa or of some state by executive officers acting
pursuant to Congressional authority.10 0 There is no apparent reason why
such a corporation should not be suable, both in the state of its charter
and elsewhere, like any other corporation organized under the state incor-
poration laws, regardless of the government's owning some, a majority or
all of the stock.10 '
Actions against Parent and Subsidiary Corporations. The increasing com-
plexity of intercorporate structures has given rise to frequent attempts by plain-
tiffs to institute actions against foreign parent corporations through service on
their subsidiaries chartered or doing business in the state. The parent's sub-
stantive liability, however, for the particular act of the subsidiary on which
the cause of action is based, under some such doctrine as "holding out" or "direct
intervention," would not of itself be conclusive of the parent's "doing business"
in the state through the subsidiary, within the requirement of the due process
clause. The criteria of this requirement are necessarily colored by the still
embryonic substantive law of parent and subsidiary corporations. 10 2
97. 39 STAT. 360 (1916), 12 U. S. C. A. § 641 et seq. (1926).
98. Leggett v. Fed. Land Bank of Columbia, 204 N. C. 151, 167 S. E. 557 (1933), 88
A. L. R. 873 (1934), noted in (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1287. But cf. Fed. Land Bank of
St. Louis v. Priddy, 295 U. S. 229, 233 (1935), cited note 95, supra (' . . the intended
scope of the liability to suit includes judicial process incident to suit.")
99. Interstate commerce: International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579 (1914).
Federal employ: Ohio River Contract Co. v. Gordon, 244 U. S. 68 (1917). If these
analogies had been brought to the court's attention, it might have held inapplicable the
provision of the act making a corporation which failed to appoint a process agent Iliable
... to the revocation of its license to do business in this state ... " without precluding
the additional consequence of liability to substituted service on the Seretary of State.
N. C. CoDE AN. (Michie, 1935) § 1137.
100. Olson v. U. S. Spruce Production Corp., 267 U. S. 462 (1925) (defendant char-
tered in the state of Washington by the Director of Aircraft Production under authority
of 40 STAT. 888 [1918J). Fo examples of both types of corporations, see Thurston, supra
note 92, at 364. A third method by which a government corporation may be created L
by the government's purchase of the stock of a private corporation.
101. Congress could undoubtedly provide otherwise even with respect to this type of
government corporations. See Fed. Land Bank of St. Louis v. Priddy, 295 U. S. 229,
231 (1935).
102. See Douglas & Shanks, Insulation frorn Liability through Subsidiary Corporations
(1929) 39 Y= L. .. 193.
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The Supreme Court has several times refused to sustain actions so instituted.103
Despite the fact, however, that there was more than .mere stock ownership in
several of the Supreme Court cases, they have not precluded the exercise of
jurisdiction by other courts on the theory of the parent's so exercising its powers
of stock ownership as to become the dominating party and real actor generally
within the state, or of the subsidiary's actually acting as the parent's general
agent, or of the disregard of the corporate entities.10 4 Conceivably jurisdiction
might likewise be obtained over a foreign subsidiary by service on the local parent
corporation if the former could be considered the real actor generally within the
state through the agency of its parent.10
ACTIONS BASED ON ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT
While even the orthodox doctrine permits the exercise of physical power over
things as well as persons,10 6 there has been an expansion of traditional concepts
103. Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U. S. 406 (1903) (service on directors
of parent domiciled in state); Peterson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 205 U. S. 364
(1907) (service on officer of parent temporarily in state) ; Phila. & R. Rr. Co. v. McIibbin,
243 U. S. 264 (1917) (same); People's Tobacco Co., Ltd., v. Amer. Tobacco Co., 246
U. S. 79 (1918) (service on Secretary of State) ; Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co.,
267 U. S. 333 (1925) (service on process agent of subsidiary), noted in Comment (1925)
20 ILL. L. R V. 281.
104. Industrial Research Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 29 F. (2d) 623 (N. D. Ohio
1928), noted in (1929) 42 Hagv. L. REV. 955; Ruff v. Manhattan Oil Co. of Del., 172
Minn. 585, 216 N. W. 331 (1927); Amer. Tri-Ergon Corp. v. Ton-Bild Syndikat, A. G.,
145 Misc. 344, 260 N. Y. Supp. 139 (Sup. Ct. 1932); Williams v. Freeport Sulphur Co.,
40 S. IV. (2d) 817 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930), noted in (1932) 30 Micn. L. Rav. 464; Bankers'
Holding Corp. v. Maybury, 161 Wash. 681, 297 Pac. 740 (1931). Corporations have been
held to be "doing business" in the state through the agency of other independent corpora.
tions. Bell v. Viavi Co., 34 Del. 76, 143 At]. 255 (1928); Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v.
Eichberg, 107 Md. 363, 68 At. 690 (1908); McNeill v. Elec. Storage Battery Co., 109 S. C.
326, 96 S. E. 134 (1918); see 1 MacHEm, ArENc (2d ed. 1914) § 173. But cf. Bank
of Amer. v. Whitney Cent. Nat. Bank, 261 U. S. 171 (1923); S. B. McMaster, Inc., v.
Chevrolet Motor Co., 3 F. (2d) 469 (E. D. S. C. 1925) (held vendor-vendee relationship
instead of sales agency).
105. Service on a domestic subsidiary, however, has been held not to give jurisdiction
over a foreign sister subsidiary. Compania Mexicana Refinadora Island, S. A., v. Companla
Metropolitana De Oleoductos, S. A., 250 N. Y. 203, 164 N. E. 907 (1928).
Additional problems in adjustment of the state of trial are raised by municipal cor-
porations and by corporations chaftered in more than one state. With respect to the
former, see Comment (1934) 68 U. S. L. Rav. 281; Note (1924) 30 A. L. R. 255, 291;
and the latter, see 2 Bar.AE, op. cit. supra note 33, §§ 203.1-207.1; Foley, Incorporation,
Multiple Incorporation, and the Conflict of Laws (1929) 42 HAuv. L. REV. $16,
106. The Belgenland, 114 U. S. 355 (1885) (jurisdiction of admiralty cou'ts over vessels);
Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316 (1890) (of equity courts over land within boundaries of
their sovereign); with respect to the types of valid decrees of the latter sort, see Comment
(1934) 18 MmN . L. Rav. 708, 726. Although there need, of course, be no service in order
to acquire personal jurisdiction, due process requires that reasonable notice be given the
defendant in an action quasi in rem. Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398 (1900) ; see note 115,
infra. The cases concerning the necessity of notice in actions in rem are in confusion.
See Note (1901) 50 L. R. A. 577, 597. See generally Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction
with respect to jurisdiction quasi in remn as well as jurisdiction in personam.
Liberal attachment and garnishment statutes, broadly construed by the courts,
have extended the plaintiff's choice of forums when jurisdiction over the person
cannot be obtained. A few courts have even allowed the attachment of
stock certificates of foreign corporations, 0 7 although the prevailing view at
common law is to the contrary.108 Likewise, while the courts uniformly refuse
to exercise jurisdiction over property of a nonresident which has been brought
into the state by force or fraud, vacating, at the request of the deceived or in-
jured defendant, an attachment so procured,'0 0 some courts allow the plaintiff
to maintain his action if he is skilful enough to secure his attachment by some
strategem not involving actual fraud. In this manner, jurisdiction has been
exercised where the defendant, a foreign corporation, had placed American
Traveler's Checks in the hands of a local agent and the plaintiff's attorney bought
such checks to the amount of the plaintiff's claim and immediately had the pro-
ceeds attached.1 0
The greatest extension of jurisdiction quasi in rein, however, has been in the
cases of garnishment of debts."' Whereas, in cases of garnishment of tangible
property, the rule is strictly applied that the possessor of a chattel of the de-
fendant cannot be garnisheed outside of the jurisdiction in which he holds the
chattel," 2 the Supreme Court has decided, in regard to garnishment of debts, that
the only situs of a debt is with the debtor, so that he may be garnisheed in any
jurisdiction where he may be served with process," 3 and such garnishment must
In Rem to Compel Payment of a Debt (1913) 27 HAv. L. Rxv. 107; Comment (1929)
14 ST. Louis L. Rlv. 170.
107. E. g., Simpson v. Jersey City Contracting Co., 165 N. Y. 193, 53 N. E. 896
(1900).
108. 1 BE ux, op. cit. supra note 33, § 107.3. Likewise, by the prevailing viewn, there
can be no attachment of a mercantile document of the defendant which happens to be
within the state. Id. § 107.4. The Un'oaR STocn Tauasrm Acr § 13, however, im-
pliedly allows attachment of certificates of stock wherever found. See (1935) 45
Y=n L. J. 379.
109. Sessoms Grocery Co. v. International Sugar Feed Co., 188 Ala. 232, 66 So. 479
(1914).
110. Siro v. Amer. Exp. Co., 99 Conn. 95, 121 AUt. 280 (1923); cf. Condon Wrapping
Mach. Co. v. Dearborn, 181 App. Div. 311, 168 N. Y. Supp. 718 (1st Dep't, 1918). See
Comment (1929) 7 N. C. L. RExv. 294.
ill. See Bailey, Sitys of Choses in Action (1897) 11 HARv. L. R v. 95, 103.
112. Pa. Rr. Co. v. Pennock, 51 Pa. 244 (1865) ; 1 BEALr, op. cit. supra note 33, §.107.6.
113. Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215 (1905), noted in (1905) 19 ILnv. L. REv. 132;
Baltimore & Ohio Rr. Co. v. Hostetler, 240 U. S. 620 (1916). But cf. N. Y. Life Ins.
Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U. S. 518 (1916), discussed in Chafee, Interstate Interpkader (1924)
33 YALE L. J. 685, 714. This principle applies equally to a foreign corporation, which may
be garnisheed by the same service which would secure jurisdiction over it if it were the
principal defendant. Louisville & N. Rr. Co. v. Deer, 200 U. S. 176 (1906); Bean v. Bean,
166 Miss. 434, 147 So. 306 (1933), noted in (1934) 6 Miss. L. J. 174. But a foreign
corporation garnishee cannot waive improper service, since it is not in the debtor's power
to bring within the court's jurisdiction a debt not otherwise within it. Amer. Discount
Corp. v. Gerrard, 156 Wash. 271, 286 Pac. 666 (1930). Statutes are frequently broad
-enough to permit the plaintiff to garnishee himself. Sandusky Cement Co. v. Hamiton
& Co., 273 Fed. 596 (N. D. Ohio 1921), noted in (1922) 35 HaRn. L. RMI. 341.
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be given full faith and credit in other states.j1 4 The net result of this decision
is that the original conception of garnishment as a proceeding based on juris-
diction quasi in rem has been superseded in practical effect, at least so far as
garnishment is concerned, by its treatment as a transitory personal action against
the garnishee." 5 The decision has been severely criticized as providing "a safe
and easy instrument of fraud,"' " but it does not require that the court of the
state in which the garnishee is found must exercise jurisdiction; the holding is
only that it might. The effect of the decision, therefore, is greatly to enhance
the utility of garnishment as an additional device for adjustment of the state of
trial to the requirements of the parties and circumstances.
NON-CONSTITUTIONAL DEVIcEs IN INTERSTATE ADJUSTMENT
The great expansion of *the plaintiff's choice of forums through legislative
and judicial liberalization of the common law doctrines of jurisdiction required
a corresponding development of methods of protecting the defendant against
actions brought in forums clearly inappropriate to their trial, lest the former
process should cause more evils than it cured. In addition to the control which
has been exercised by means of the constitutional formulas, the courts have de-
veloped certain non-constitutional devices toward this end.
Injunctions against Actions in Other States. It was inevitable that equity
should attempt to supply the finer flexibility which even the loose constitutional
formulas could not attain. There developed at an early date the practice of
granting an injunction, at the suit of the law defendant, against the law plain.
tiff's commencing a threatened action or proceeding with an action already begun
in another state." 7 Courts, however, are reluctant to interfere with the free
access of suitors to other courts of equal dignity and competent jurisdiction,
and, therefore, will grant such injunctions only under special circumstances.
114. The remedy of garnishment is denied when the garnishee's debt to the principal
debtor is recoverable in a foreign countty, which would not be obligated to give such full
faith and credit to the garnishment adjudication as would protect the garnishee against a
suit by the principal. debtor.' Weitzel v. Weitzel, 27 Ariz. 117, 230 Pac. 1106 (1924),
noted in (1925) 38 HR4v. L. Rlv. 1114 (wages due in Mexico); Parker v. Nat. Fire Ins.
Co., 111 Conn. 383, 150 Atl. 313 (1930) (insurance claim due in Haiti). But see Chafee,
supra note 113, at 709.
115. Notice, however, is still required by the due process clause to be given the principal
debtor, although publication may suffice. Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 21S (1905). Of
course, where a judgment has been obtained against the principal debtor before garnishment
is brought, there is no more necessity for notice than there would be with respect tor
ordinary attachment execution. Endicott-Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, 266 U. S.
285 (1924).
116. See 1 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 33, § 108.4. Contra: see Carpenter, Jurisdiction,
over Debts for the Purpose of Administration, Garnishment, and Taxation (1918) 31 HAIv.
L. REV. 905; MINOR, CoNcrcT or LAWS (1901) § 125.
117. Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107 (1890) ; see Messner, The Jurisdiction of a Court
of Equity over Persons to Compel the Doing of Acts Outside the Territorial Limits of the,
State (1930) 14 MINN. L. REv. 494; Comment (1932) 31 Micu. L. RaV. 88. Such relief,
quite properly, is usually refused unless both parties are residents of the state. Barrett
v. Russell, 75 Misc. 226, 135 N. Y. Supp. 34 (Sup. Ct. 1912).
[Vol, 451240
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A mere showing by the equity plaintiff that defending the action in the foreign
jurisdiction will inconvenience him" s or that the law plaintiff will have an ad-
vantage in matters of procedure, or perhaps even of substantive common law
rules, is insufficient 1 9 But if it can be proved that the plaintiff is proceeding
abroad simply to vex and harass the defendant,12 0 or that the foreign action
would result in the "evasion" of a strong domestic policy,'^' the injunction
will issue. Such decrees are most frequently granted on the latter ground,
usually to prevent garnishment or attachment in a foreign jurisdiction which
will avoid the local exemption or insolvency statutes. -
The injunction granted, however, there is still the troublesome question of its
recognition in the foreign forum. Such decrees are generally not given full
faith and credit.' 23 Nevertheless, the injunction is not of negligible value, for,
118. So. Pac. Co. v. Baum, 38 P. (2d) 1106 (N. M. 1934) ; see Note (1928) 57 A. L. R. 77.
119. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. Rr. Co. v. Ball, 126 Kan. 745, 271 Pac. 313 (1928) (unanimous
jury verdict not required abroad); Fed. Trust Co. v. Conklin, 87 N. J. Eq. 185, 99 AtL
109 (Ch. 1916) (right of set-off); see Pound, Progress of the Law, 1918-1919 (1920) 33
HIAv. L. Rrv. 420, 427.
120. Standard Roller Bearing Co. v. Crucible Steel Co. of Amer., 71 N. J. Eq. 61,
63 AUt. 546 (Ch. 1906); see Note (1925) 34 YA=m L. J. 912.
121. The argument based on differences in procedure or substantive law may at times
seem indistinguishable from that based on public policy. Weaver v. Ala. Great So. Rr.
Co., 200 Ala. 432, 76 So. 364 (1917) (decree on basis of difference between "conclusive"
presumption in local courts and only rebuttable presumption abroad); Culp v. Butler, 69
Ind. App. 668, 122 N. E. 634 (1919) (different statutes of limitations).
122. Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107 (1890); Dehon v. Foster, 86 Mass. S45 (1862).
Injunctions against prosecuting actions in other jurisdictions are granted on the assumption,
of course, that the foreign forum will entertain transitory actions whenever the defendant
is subject to its jurisdiction, but the courts do not seem to feel themselves precluded from
issuing such injunctions although they entertain the same viev.s themselves. Compare Union
Pac. Rr. Co. v. Rule, 155 Minn. 302, 193 N. W. 161 (1923), noted in Comment (1924)
22 MNac. L. Rrv. 469, (1923) 37 HARv. L. REV. 157, (1923) 33 YAE L. J. 95, with VLser
v. Modem Woodmen of Amer., 132 Minn. 167, 156 N. W. 271 (1916).
123. Frye v. Chicago, R. L & P. Ry. Co., 157 M1inn. 52, 195 N. W. 629 (1923), curt.
denied, 263 U. S. 723 (1924); see Comment (1924) 72 U. or PA. L. REV. 429. Contra:
Allen v. Chicago G. W. Rr. Co., 239 Ill. App. 38 (1925); Fisher v. Pac. Mlut. Life Ins. Co,
112 Miss. 30, 72 So. 846 (1916); cf. Bacon, Baldwin & Co. v. Home & Co., 123 Pa. 452,
16 At. 794 (1889); see GoonaicH, op. cit. supra note 74, at 207. The issue of the com-
pulsory recognition of such decrees has never been passed on by the Supreme Court and
only one dissenting opinion in a state court has been found in the affirmative. See Union
Pac. Rr. Co. v. Rule, 155 Minn. 302, 306, 193 N. W. 161, 162 (1923); Comment (1930)
39 Y= u L. J. 719. It has been said that such decrees should be entitled to no greater
recognition than statutes prohibiting the export of causes of action. See Union Pac. Rr.
Co. v. Rule, supra, at 306, 193 N. W. at 162. The latter need not be recognized in other
states, although the first s ate has created the action by statute. Tenn. Coal, Iron & Rr.
Co. v. George, 233 U. S. 354 (1914); see Langmaid, The Full Faith and Credit Required
for Public Acts (1929) 24 Ir.L. L. REv. 383; Comment (1935) 45 Y=Xjn L. 3. 339. But
courts of equity presumably consider the peculiar facts of each case. Cf. Parker v. Krau
Co., Ltd., 157 Misc. 667, 234 N. Y. Supp. 478 (Sup. Ct. 1935), noted in (1936) 45 YA=n
L. J. 1150 (contractual stipulation giving exclusive jurisdiction to courts of one state held
invalid as against public policy).
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in addition to its moral effect, supported by the threat of contempt proceedings
if the law plaintiff ever reenters the state,1 24 the foreign court may recognize
and follow the equity court's findings of the facts in a bill for an injunction against
the plaintiff brought by the law defendant in the foreign jurisdiction itself.
1
M
Declaratory Judgments to Bar Actions in Other States. The recent extension
of declaratory judgment acts suggests the possibility that the defendant in the
principal action, if he can obtain jurisdiction over the plaintiff, may request
the local court to adjudicate his non-liability and that such a judgment might
bar the further maintenance of the foreign action, obviating the difficulty of
enforcing an injunction. 26 But there is no known case where this plan has been
attempted. Its efficacy would seem to depend on whether the general re-
luctance to recognize injunctions against foreign actions is due essentially to
their being equitable decrees or to the feeling that their enforcement would be
contrary to the public policy of the forum. If the latter, declaratory judg-
ments would hardly be more successful, unless the Supreme Court ruled that
the full faith and credit clause demanded their recognition.
Discretion in the Trial Court. Finally, the courts under certain circumstances
decline in their discretion to exercise the jurisdiction that they possess, com-
promising between the traditional concept that suit can be brought on a transi-
tory cause of action wherever the defendant or his property can be "found" and
the impropriety of trying certain types of actions. 27 Thus, where the defendant
has been fraudulently induced by the plaintiff into entering the state, summons
there served upon him will be set aside upon motion made in good time. 128 This
rule is not due to any lack of jurisdiction, for a third person who has not par-
ticipated in the fraud can obtain a valid judgment against the defendant by
serving him while he is in the state.'2 9 Similarly, although homage is still paid
the general rule that the courts will not interfere with the internal affairs of a
foreign corporation, this again, according to the Supreme Court, is not a matter
124. Kempson v. Kempson, 63 N. J. Eq. 783, 52 AtI. 360 (1902).
125. See Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N. Y. 156, 166 (1854); RESTAT=EENT § 449; Goodrich,
Institute Bards and Yale Reviewers (1936) 84 U. or PA. L. Rav. 449. Contra: see
Lorenzen & Heilman, The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws (1935) 83 U. o0' PA. L. RLy.
555, 581. Furthermore, an injunction might be obtained more readily against the enforce-
ment of the judgment obtained abroad in defiance of the prior injunction. Ellerman Lines,
Ltd., v. Read, E19281 2 K. B. 144. And, although writs of sequestration do not seem to
have been used in aid of mere restraining orders, they might be so extended in order to
subject the recalcitrant plaintiff's local property to their operation. See HusTON, ENro c -
MENT Or DECREES IN EQuITY (1915) 81.
126. See Foster, supra note 4, 43 HAgv. L. REv. at 1241, n. 64.
127. This is an example of the synthesis to which Mr. Justice Cardozo refers of the,
"method of tradition" and the "method of sociology." See CADOZO, Tn GROWr OP
TnE LAW (1924) 62. The court in Cressey v. Erie Rr. Co., 278 Mass. 284, 291, 180 N. H.
160, 163 (1932) shows a keen perception of the problem.
128. Townsend v. Smith, 47 Wis. 623, 3 N. W. 439 (1879); cf. Stewart v. Ramsey,
242 U. S. 128 (1916) '(person attending court as suitor or witness is privileged not to be
served); see Comment (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 889. But cf. Gumperz v. Hofman, 283 N. Y.
Supp. 823 (1st Dep't, 1935), noted in (1936) 5 BROoxLYN L. REv. 217 (defendant who hasa,
voluntarily entered state may be served by deception). See note 109, supra.
129. Ex parte Taylor, 29 R. I. 129, 69 Atl. 553 (1908). Cf. note 110, supra.
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,of jurisdiction, but one of discretion to decline to exercise the jurisdiction that
the court possesses where "considerations of convenience, efficiency and justice
point to the courts of the state of the domicil as appropriate tribunals for the
determination of the particular case."' 30 It is generally recognized, further,
that there is a discretionary power to dismiss without prejudice where both
parties are aliens or foreign corporations, 131 and some courts, particularly those
of New York, apply the same principle where the parties are residents of sister
states,132 although the New York courts limit it to the field of tort actions.'=
Any doubt as to the constitutionality of this practice under the privileges and
immunities clause was dispelled by the Supreme Court's decision in Douglas v.
New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company, at least where both
parties are nonresident and the cause of action is foreign.134
It is probable that any substantial further progress that is made in adjusting
the state of forum will be along these lines. The constitutional formulas can
ultimately prevent only the gravest types of abuses, and even the equity prac-
tice of enjoining actions in other states has become so circumscribed by fixed
doctrine that a decree will not be granted merely to balance the relative con-
veniences of the parties, while it is of doubtful practical value even where it
,can be obtained.j 35 Determination of the appropriate state of forum entails a
130. Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U. S. 123, 131 (1933); see BowSs, JUMcXLM
DisCrEoN or TarAL Couers (1931) §§ 43-46; Comments (1929) 29 Cox. L. REv. 968;
(1933) 33 Cor. L. Rs.v. 492; (1933) 31 Mica. L. RErv. 682; Note (1922) 18 A. L. R. 1383.
Note also the discretion to refuse to entertain an action of garnishment of a debt allowed
in Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215 (1905).
131. Canada Malting Co., Ltd., v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U. S. 413 (1932);
see Note (1924) 32 A. L. R. 6, 8. Jurisdiction is exercised, if at all, as a matter of comity.
132. Summerall v. United Fruit Co., 11 F. Supp. 963 (S. D. N. Y. 1935); Ariz. Commer-
cial Mlining Co. v. Iron Cap Copper Co., 233 Bass. 522, 124 N. E. 281 (1919); Pietrarola
v. N. J. & Hudson River Ry. & Ferry Co., 197 N. Y. 434, 91 N. E. 120 (1910); Gainer
v. Donner, 140 Misc. 841, 251 N. Y. Supp. 713 (Sup. Ct. 1931) (although accident occurred
in N. Y.); State ex rel. Goldwyn Distributing Corp. v. Gehrz, 181 Wis. 238, 194 N. W.
418 (1923). But jurisdiction is exercised, although both parties are nonresidents and the
cause of action is foreign, when a refusal would work a hardship. Burdick v. Freeman,
120 N. Y. 420, 24 N. E. 949 (1890); Murnan v. Wabash Ry. Co., 246 N. Y. 244, 158
N. E. 508 (1927), reargued, 222 App. Div. 833, 226 N. Y. Supp. 393 (2d Dep't, 1928).
133. Reeve v. Cromwell, 227 App. Div. 32, 237 N. Y. Supp. 20 (1st Dep't, 1929). See
Gaither, Jurisdiction of Foreign Causes of Action (1932) 66 U. S. L. Rnv. 303; Note (1933)
87 A. L. R. 1425.
134. 279 U. S. 377 (1929); see Chambers v. Baltimore & 0. Rr. Co., 207 U. S. 142,
148 (1907); Comments (1930) 18 CALna. L. rxv. 159; (1932) 30 Aica L. Rsv. 610;
(1930) 39 YALE L. J. 388. A few courts, however, have found themselves powerles on
non-constitutional grounds to refuse to exercise juris iction and dissented from the Douglas
case, supra, construing the New York statute there involved as creating rather than limiting
an otherwise broader power of dismissa. Boright v. Chicago, R. L & P. Rr. Co., ISO
Blinn. 52, 230 N. W. 457 (1930), noted in (1930) 30 Co. L. Rnv. 1207; followed in
Doyle v. No. Pac. Ry. Co., 55 F. (2d) 708 (D. Mlinn. 1932), noted in (1933) 46 r, n .
L. Rzv. 521; Bright v. Wheelock, 323 Mlo. 840, 20 S. W. (2d) 634 (1929); Mlattone v.
Argentina, 123 Ohio St. 393, 175 N. E. 603 (1931).
135. Mluch could be done to remedy the latter situation through appropriate legislation
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consideration of many factors--the type of action, the number of necessary wit-
nesses, their distance from the forum, the residence of the parties-and all these
factors can be carefully weighed only by the exercise of the court's discretion to
consent or refuse to exercise jurisdiction in each particular case. This would
tend toward a treatment of the problem of the state of forum as it should ideally
be treated, as a question essentially administrative in character, not as a philo-
sophical issue.138
Analogies might be drawn from the traditional exercise of such discretionary
power with respect to motions for change of venue from one county to another
within the same state.1s 7 There are, of course, obstacles to an application of
the intrastate analogy of venue to the interstate problem of jurisdiction, for the
courts of state Y, to which the courts of state X have remitted the plaintiff, may
disagree with the latter courts as to the proper state of forum and likewise de-
cline to entertain jurisdiction, with consequent loss to the plaintiff of the advan-
tage of attachment liens or of his having "found" an elusive defendant, as well
as a possible bar by reason of statutes of limitations. But these obstacles, it
has been observed, are superficial, and avoidable by adapting to the problem of
the place of trial the machinery of conditional decrees and rulings on motions
with which the courts are familiar in other connections. 18 8 Thus, dismissal
could be made to operate for all practical purposes as a change of venue by
being conditioned on the defendant's stipulating to admit service and waive
the statute of limitations, if necessary, together with all other objections to
proceeding in the state which he contends is more appropriate; or the initial
court might, instead of dismissing, stay the action subject to appropriate con-
ditions, including a stipulation permitting the summary entry of judgment in
case of obstructive tactics on the part of the defendant abroad. On the other
hand, if the court in its discretion decides to exercise jurisdiction, it may adopt
certain safeguards for the protection of the defendant, such as reasonable con-
tinuances to allow distant defendants time to prepare an adequate defence, re-
opening of default judgments obtained without notice,180 and perhaps the
requirement of a bond in the case of a nonresident plaintiff as evidence of his
under the full faith and credit clause. See Cook, The Powers of Congress under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause (1919) 28 YALE L. 3. 421.
136. See CARDozo, TnE NATURE OF THM JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) 141; Hurley v. Wells-
Newton Nat. Corp., 49 F. (2d) 914, 919 (D. Conn. 1931). But cf. Creageyr v. Collier &
Son Co., 36 F. (2d) 783, 786 (S. D. Tex. 1929). It has been observed that this Is in
effect a recognition of the civil law plea of forum non conveniens, and that the doctrine
has been recognized in the United States, although the Latin phrase is not often used,
See Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law (1929) 29
Cor. L. Rv. 1; Dainow, supra note 83; Hansell, The Proper Forum for Suits Against
Foreign Corporations (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 12; Comments (1930) 15 Mnin. L. Irv, 83;
(1928) 37 YALE L. J. 983.
137. Holmes v. Wainwright, 3 East 329 (K. B. 1803).
138. See Foster, supra note 4, 44 HAav. L. REv. at 47 et seq.
139. A few states have so provided in their nonresident motorist statutes. It.. Rv.
STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 9532, § 23; Tax. Amr. Cxv. STAT. (Vernon, 1935) art.
2039a, § 6.
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good faith, at least to cover costs and traveling expenses if judgment goes against
him.
40
FINALITY ori RULINGS ON JURISDICTION
All these methods of control, however, in order effectively to protect the
defendant from vexatiously transported actions without at the same time un-
duly protracting the litigation, require that there be an initial determination
of the question of jurisdiction which is conclusive against any subsequent col-
lateral attack. The trend has been in this direction. Since the full faith nd
credit clause applies only to judgments of courts which have jurisdiction over
the parties and the subject matter, jurisdiction was traditionally said to be
always open to inquiry when it was drawn in question collaterally in another
state.' 4 ' The Supreme Court, however, soon began to make inroads into this
doctrine,'4 until it is now quite clear that the principle of res adjudicata applies
to decisions on jurisdictional questions as well as to other issues, saving them
from subsequent attack in the Same state or in any other, so long as the defendant
appeared and participated in the proceedings and the court purported to render
a judgment against him.143 Doubt has been expressed as to the applicability of
the last statement to jurisdiction over the subject matter,' 4 but there would seem
to be no compelling reason for limiting it to jurisdiction over the parties, at least
where the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter has been squarely
presented by a motion to dismiss made on either special or general appearance
and has been determined by a contested hearing. 4 5 There has been, in fact,
140. This provision, too, appears in a few nonresident motorist statutes. ILL. RL%.
STAT. An'. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 95Y, § 23; AIl. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 29, § 131; Mxn.
Comp. LAWS (1929) § 4791; N. Y. VHIcrE AND Trric Law (1929) § 53. Statutes re-
quiring similar bonds of nonresident defendants do not violate the privileges and immunities
clause. See Blake v. AcClung, 172 U. S. 239, 256 (1898).
141. Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1S73); Andrews v. Andrews, 183
U. S. 14 (1903).
142. Findings of jurisdiction were held binding when they were the result of Etatutory
construction by the highest courts of sister states. Amer. Ry. Exp. Co. v. Royster Guano
Co., 273 U. S. 274 (1927); Grubb v. Public Utilities Comm. of Ohio, 281 U. S. 470 (1930).
And a distinction was early made between the jurisdictional facts themselves of jurkdiction
over the person and subject matter and the "quasi-jurisdictional" facts which had to be
proved before the court could act, the latter not being open to collateral attack in a
second state. Noble v. Union P. L. Rr. Co., 147 U. S. 165 (1893).
143. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Mlen's Ass'n, 283 U. S. 522 (1931); Amer. Surety
Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156 (1932), noted in (1934) 12 N. C. L. REv. 250, (1932) 42
YAE L. J. 427; Hall v. Wilder AMfg. Co., 316 Mlo. 812, 293 S. W. 7C0 (1927); Simmons
Co. v. Sloan, 104 N. J. L. 612, 142 AUt. 15 (1928); REST.,TE.,"r § 451; sce Dledina,
Conclusiveness of Rulings on Jurisdiction (1931) 31 CoL. L. RXv. 23S; Comments (1928)
41 H] uv. L. REv. 1055; (1931) 26 Irx. L. REv. 432. Contra: Farrier, Ful Faith and Credit
of Adjudication of Jurisdictional Facts (1935) 2 U. or Cur. L. REv. "552. The question
had been expressly reserved in Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U. S. 25 (1917),
where it was held that it would be no lack of due process if such a decision did receive
recognition in a second state.
144. RsTATU xNT § 451, Caveat.
145. The two Baldwin cases, cited note 143, supra, have been cited in cases dearly
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for some time a noticeable tendency to disregard the old dogma of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, as well as over the parties, either by relying on the doc-
trine of estoppel against the assertion of the lack of jurisdiction by a party who
has invoked the court's jurisdiction or accepted the fruits of its exercise,140 or
by strengthening the presumption in favor of the validity of the judgment of a
court of general jurisdiction'
47
This new doctrine of the conclusiveness of rulings on jurisdiction may place
the defendant in an embarrassing position in those states where an exception
properly taken to an adverse ruling on an objection to the jurisdiction is held to
be waived by a subsequent plea in bar and defense on the merits.1 48  If hec
does defend on the merits, he waives his objection to the jurisdiction,1 4 and if
he lets the action go to final judgment on the overruling of his plea to the juris-
diction and appeals, he risks all on his one more or less doubtful defense to the
jurisdiction, sacrificing any defense he might have had on the merits if the judg-
ment is affirmed. 150 He can, of course, enter no appearance at all and let judg-
involving the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter for the general proposition
that "the principles of res adjudicata apply to questions of jurisdiction as well as to otheir
issues." Cf. Catholic Soc. of Religious & Literary Education v. Madison County, 74 F.
(2d) 848, 850 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935) (finding of lack of jurisdiction) ; see Hamilton Gas Co.
v. Watters, 79 F. (2d) 438, 440 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935). Contra: see Jackson & Sons v.
Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 86 N. H. 341, 342, 168 Atl. 895, 896 (1933) (not citing
the Baldwin cases, cited note 143, supra); cf. Baltimore Mail Steamship Co. v. Fawcett,
269 N. Y. 379, 199 N. E. 628 (1936) (same). Since, however, jurisdiction over the
subject matter, unlike jurisdiction over the person, is not waived by any sort of
appearance, it would seem that the former's existence should be open to attack at any
time until final judgment, either directly o r collaterally. See generally Gavit, Jurisdicton
of the Subject Matter and Res Judicata (1932) 80 U. or PA. L. Rxv. 386.
146. Bledsoe v. Seaman, 77 Kan. 679, 95 Pac. 576 (1908); Langewald v. Langewald,
234 Mass. 269, 125 N. E. 566 (1920); see 1 FaREEtAN, JuDomNrs (5th ed. 1925) § 320;
3 id. § 1438. Contra: see Grubb v. Public Utilities Comm. of Ohio, 281 U. S. 470, 475V
(1930); cf. Hollingshead v. Hollingshead, 91 N. J. Eq. 261, 110 Atl. 19 (Ch. 1920)
(exception in divorce cases).
147. See Knowles v. Gaslight & Coke Co., 19 Wall. 58, 61 (U. S. 1873). A federal
court's judgment cannot be attacked collaterally for want of diversity; the court Is,
"presumed" to have found that fact to exist. McCormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat. 19Z
(U. S. 1825); Dowell v. Applegate, 152 U. S. 327 (1894); Windholz v. Everett, 74 F. (2d)
834 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935). This rule has been applied even though the record showed a
positive lack of diversity on its face. Des Moines Navigation & Rr. Co. v. Iowa Homestead
Co., 123 U. S. 552, 557 (1887). Jurisdiction of an administrative board over the subject
matter has been held to be waived. Grasselli Chemical Co. v. Simon, 84 Ind. App, 327,
150 N. E. 617 (1925); see note 149, infra.
148. Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Hickson, 197 Ill. 117, 64 N. E. 248 (1902); Newcomb
v. N. Y. Cent. & Hudson River Rr. Co., 182 Mo. 687, 81 S. W. 1069 (1904) ; see Sunderland,
Preserving a Special Appearance (1911) 9 M&cz. L. Rr-v. 396.
149. It is true that there can properly be no "waiver" of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. See note 145, supra. But this doctrine is not incompatible with the application
of the res adjudicata doctrine to jurisdictional questions, for the defendant, by nppeaving
and litigating the question, does not "waive" the objection, but simply subjects himself
to the liability that an adverse decision may be reached which will bind him.
150. He might be able to secure a writ of prohibition after the overruling of his motion
ment go by default, thus preserving his right to attack the judgment collaterally,
either by resisting an action thereon or by enjoining its execution, but these
tactics may again deprive him completely of his defense on the merits if his
attack is unsuccessful.' 5' Perhaps it is desirable that the defendant should be
thus compelled unalterably to select one defense. In any event, however, his
predicament can be solved very simply, either by these states' adopting the present
federal rule, which does allow a reservation of the jurisdictional question on a
plea in bar, 5 2 or by their permitting an interlocutory appeal, as some states do,
from the overruling of the objection to the jurisdictionY
3
CONCLUSION
While the problem of interstate adjustment of the place of trial within the
confines of constitutional limitations remains a perplexing one, the courts as a
whole have progressed far from the traditional territorial concept of jurisdic-
tion as based on physical power. Indeed, some critics, pointing to the domicil
statutes, the motorist acts and finally the Goodman case, observe that this entire
adjustment process is effecting a gradual abandonment of the common law
tenets in favor of the civil law concept of jurisdiction as based on domicil or the
performance of an act within the state.'54 This is probably an overstatement, for,
insofar as the courts have concerned themselves at all with the theoretical basis
of jurisdiction, 5 they have been very careful to preserve the territorial fiction
through the use of statutory agents and implied consent formulas. It is signi-
ficant that even those comparatively few courts which have expressly recognized
the recently proposed "act" or "submission" theories of jurisdiction 5 0 have
uniformly respected the formality of serving a statutory agent,25 - although, if
doing business or driving a car within the state is actually the basis of juris-
diction, there would seem to be no reason why the requirements of due process
could not be met as well merely by the service of process directly upon the de-
to dismiss. Jardine v. Superior Ct., 213 Cal. 301, 2 P. (2d) 756 (1931); d. Baltimore
Mail Steamship Co. v. Fawcett, 269 N. Y. 379, 199 N. E. 628 (1936). But the remedy iL
an extraordinary one which courts are loath to grant, and its propriety is somewhat doubtful
under the rule of Amer. Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156 (1932), cited note 143, supra.
151. The same problem arises in states like Texas, where no special appearanqp iL
allowed and the defendant is confined to raising his due process objection only on collateral
attack. York v. Texas, 137 U. S. 15 (1890).
152. James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U. S. 119 (1927).
153. Baltimore Mail Steamship Co. v. Fawcett, 269 N. Y. 379, 199 N. E. 628 (1936).
154. See Ross, The Shifting Basis of Jurisdiction (1933) 17 Mrn1. L. RM,. 146; Zee
note 7, supra.
155. See Erving v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 171 Minn. 87, 9D, 214 N. W. 12, 13 (1927).
156. The "submission" theory was introduced by Judge Learned land in Smolik v.
Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 Fed. 148 (S. D. N. Y. 1915). The "act" theory
is proposed in REsTATEuENT § 48; Goodrich, supra note 125, at 459; Comment (1929)
42 sA v. L. REv. 1062. Contra: Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v. Rajah of Faridkote [1894]
A. C. 670; see Lorenzen & Heilman, supra note 125, at 566.




fendant without the state.' 58 The cases seem to be compatible only with the
conclusion that jurisdiction in this country has developed primarily, within a
few familiar formulas, according to an opportunist policy based on day-to-day
exigencies. The intricate metaphysics as to the nature of actions and the theory
of jurisdiction which has complicated the problem of interstate adjustment is,
whatever its worth, in large part merely a posteriori rationalization by commen-
tators of the progress which the courts have made pragmatically. Their philos-
ophy, if any, seems to been the purely utilitarian one of determining the most
convenient forum for all the parties.
DISPUTES WITHIN TRADE UNIONS
CoAinETITIoN for power and conflicts over policy have been basic and per-
sistent sources of unrest within trade unions in the United States. Insofar as
the internal political machinery of unions is incapable of achieving a peaceful
resolution of difficulties so deep-rooted, and insofar further as that machinery
is in the control of trade union bosses who use the weapons of trade union
discipline to crush opposition, conflicts of this kind between rival factions within
unions have given rise to litigation with increasing frequency. Such conflicts
come before the courts in the guise of suits to test the permissible scope of
union discipline, involving mainly the interpretation of union constitutions and
by-laws to discover what measure of individual freedom members have surren-
dered for.the attainment of the discipline essential to effective union activity.
But the issues strike deeper than the rules which govern fines, expulsions, and
union elections; for, despite the fact that the doctrine of working class unity
is superficially proclaimed,' the violent and protracted internal struggles typical
of contemporary trade union history appear to arise from fundamental conflicts
of principle rather than from the normal routine of union discipline. 2
The dispute between the proponents of craft or industrial unionism represents
one sharp line of cleavage within the ranks of labor which has contributed to
the flow of cases between union groups. Since its earliest days when skill
was a significant factor in industrial life the American labor movement has
been based upon the craft principle of organization. While craft interests have
158. Only one case has been found involving such service, and it was approved. Stevens
v. Television, Inc., 111 N. J. Eq. 306, 162 Atl. 248 (Ch. 1932), noted In (1933) 18 CoRN.
L. Q. 435.'
1. See, e. g., Preamble of Constitution of A. F. of L.: "A struggle is going on in
all the nations of the civilized world between the oppressors and the oppressed of all
countries, a struggle between the capitalist and the laborer, which grows in intensity from
year to year, and will work disastrous results to the toiling millons if they are not
combined for mutual protection and benefit."
2. The violence of disputes within unions in this country is a peculiarly AnIeacan
phenomenon. For a contrast with the European situation, see KOPALD, Ran.0uo IN
LAnOR UNIONS (1924) 274. For a well documented discussion of all phases of Internal
union problems, see BROoxs, THn UNmTz Ta xnau WoRmEmS OF A.XEuCA (unpublished
Ph. D. thesis, Yale, 1935).
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so far been successful in maintaining their position against those who in
increasing numbers urge that the industry is the effective unit for labor activity,
they seem bound to lose in the long run, to company unions4 if not to larger
industrial unions. In the light of the revolutionary technological developments
of the last two generations the craft is no longer an organic unit for collective
action.5 Machine productive methods, leveling skills, destroy the vitality of
craft distinctions upon which craft unionism is based, and insistence upon craft
principles is seriously hampering union development, particularly in the un-
organized industries.6 The chance for resolution of this conflict properly lies
in a democratic political life within unions. The American Federation of Labor,
however, is primarily a federation of craft unions. Its leaders; practically all
of whom have been recruited from the crafts, rely upon the maintenance of
the status quo for the continuance of their power i  Even the method of
representation at American Federation of Labor conventions greatly exaggerates
the influence of the craft unions at the expense of the federal, industrial unions.8
3. At the last convention of the A. F. of L., 24 resolutions advocating industrial unionism
were introduced. They were voted down 18,024 to 10,933 after hours of debate. Pro-
ceedings, 55th Convention, A. F. of L. (1935) 521-575. "A popular referendum vote,
however, would have shown a larger number adhering to the industrial union Eide, for
the Fede-al unions, which voted quite solidly for industrial unions, were limited to only
one vote each at the convention, no matter how large their membership." Stark, A. F. of L.
Is Divided on Two Union Plans, N. Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1935, at IV, 10, col. 3.
4. In the mass production industries, where the A. F. of L. has so largely failed to
gain membership, company unions have grown most rapidly. See Report of National
Industrial Conference Board, Individual and Collective Bargaining Under the N. I. R. A.
(Nov. 1933).
5. As craft distinctions merge, jurisdictional disputes between craft unions increase in
severity and cost and seriously hamper union development. Stark, Problems of Labor
Leadership (1936) 184 ANr.s 199, 201. See also BL , JuR icrio:AL Dmssus
RESULMIG F'ROM Sm'ucruRAL DmmREcEs 321 Am mncu T ADE Uiao:;s (1913); Wir.m.E,
JURSDICION nz Amamracan BuoImI TRaans (1914). For an exposition of the prac-
tical difficulties encountered in the application of the craft principle to the auto industry,
see Proceedings, 55th Convention, A. F. of L. (1935) 732-736.
6. William Green, President of the A. F. of L., concerning the auto industry, admitted:
"That industry has a possibility of over a half million members in the organized labor
movement. Today I am sorry to say we have 35,000. A year ago there were more, but
for different reasons they are not with us now. . . . Ir. Knudsen, one of the officials of
General Motors, laughed at the efforts of the A. F. of L. to organize the automobile
industry." Proceedings, op. cit. supra note 5, at 730-731.
In some instances rubber, steel, and auto workers, within the structure of company
unions, have vigorously pressed for better conditions. Certain steel company unions have
even contemplated the merger of separate company unions into a national organization.
Such spontaneous movements, however, have remained outside the "labor movement" proper.
N. Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1935, at 16, col. 2.
7. "The A. F. of L. is itself one of the Vested Interests, as ready as any other to do
battle for its own margin of privilege and profit .... It is officered by tacticians, s'+fied
in the ways and means of bargaining with politicians and intimidating employers and
employees" VEBLEY, Tim ENGINEERS AND THE PRIcE SYsTm (1921) 88-89.
8. At the 1935 Convention of the A. F. of L., 411 votes were cast from the 111,489
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Under such circumstances, where the interests of industrial unionists are not
adequately represented within the labor movement and where leaders at times
abuse their power to defend their status, it is not surprising that these disputes
do not remain within the unions to be fought out in debates and elections.
Since these conflicts often lead to the imposition of penalties for alleged breaches
of union rules and since in proper cases the determination of the proper scope
of union discipline is within judicial cognizance, the forum shifts to the courts.
Differences between union groups as to the militancy of the policy which the
union should pursue with respect to employers is another pregnant source of
violent internal discord often leading to litigation. "Business unionism," a
policy of cooperation with employers, is the culmination of early craft union
philosophy developed by skilled workers organized in exclusive craft groups.10
They did not doubt that they would share abundantly in the fruits of economic
progress, and, in fact, many of them seemed to step with facility from shop
and bench to office and exchange. Labor leaders have realized today the hopes
of those early years in lucrative salaries," social emoluments, 12 government
members (ratio of 1 to 271) of the 1,354 local and federal unions chartered directly by
the Federation and which represent the industrial point of view for the most part. On
the other hand, 29,205 votes were cast from the 2,933,898 members (ratio of 1 to 100)
of the 109 national and international unions, substantially all of which are craft unions.
A part of the discrepancy, however, must be ascribed to the inability or failure of all
local and federal unions to send representatives to the Convention. Proceedings, op. cit.
supra note 3, at xx, 29.
9. This apt phrase has been created and expounded by Professor Hoxie: "It aims
chiefly at more, here and now, for the organized workers of the craft or industry, .. .
'regardless for the most part of the welfare of the workers outside the particular organic
group. . . . It is conservative . .. and accepts as inevitable, if not as just, the existing
capitalistic organization and the wage system, as well as existing property rights and the
binding force of contract . . .It tends to emphasize discipline within the organization,
and is prone to develop strong leadership and to become somewhat autocratic in govern-
ment. . . .It favors voluntary arbitration, deprecates strikes, and avoids political action."
HoxiE, TRADE UNmOqISM mn THE UNITED STATES (1920) 45-46. See also 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF SOCIAL SCIENCES (1935) 3-5, 40-45; The American Federation of Labor (Dec. 1933)
8 FORTUNE, no. 6, p. 80.
10. See CommoNs, HIsTORY or LABOR IN T=E UNITED STATES (1918) Vol. II, 308-309,
395-429, 521-537; LORWN, THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR (1933) 1-53; PmrumAN,
A TnmOiY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT (1928) 154-233. The following statement from the
preamble of the constitution of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers is relevant: "The
interests of the employer and the employee being coordinate, the aim of the organization
will be cooperation and the cultivation of amicable relations with the employer. .... )
U. S. Bureau of Labo Statistics, Handbook of American Trade Unions, Bull. No. S06
(1929) 85.
11. The salaries of some union presidents are as follows: Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers, $25,000; A. F. of L., $12,000; United Mine Workers, $12,000; Int. Longshore-
men's Ass'n, $15,000. When it was proposed to reduce the number on the executivo boavd
of one of the large unions, one of the members of that board stated candidly: "I am
one man that wants my job, and I am not going to stand here and tell you that I don't
care anything about a $5,000 a year job. Some of them will stand here and tell you that,
but they are lying when they say it." Proceedings, 17th Convention, Int. Ass'n of
'Machinists (1924) 112. Vice-President Murray of the United Mine Workers at the 1927
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positions,13 property ownership, 14 and, above all, power; and so have highly
skilled workers, a constantly diminishing class, who command an income well
above the average and who are united in exclusive craft groups.'6 To a
substantial number of workers, on the other hand, "business unionism" has
not brought comparable protection and advancement. They see the threat of
unemployment in technological advance and have suffered in recurrent business
cycles.' 6 The more militant among them are impatient with compromise and
inaction and urge a more aggressive union policy.
This conflict of attitude is most clearly focussed in the opposition of dissident
factions to the numerous instances where official policies have followed lines
of cooperation, caution, and delay.17 Wage reductions not only have often been
Convention obtained a raise in salary from $7.000 to $9,000 after the pleas: "You can
consider me a miner with a grievance. I am fighting for just wages." Fos=n, Dlism.,%ms
OF LABOR (1927) 199.
12. The President of the National Garment Workers Union wrote, "The union leaders
acquired a remarkable importance. Their presence was solicited at the most prominent
public and social functions.. . . They became the associates of eminent men, confidential
advisors of Governors and Presidents, special guests at swell dinners, star speakers at
imposing gatherings.... I, like my associates, was bewildered at these attentions." White,
A Labor Leader's Own Story (Nov. 1911) 23 WORLD'S WOR, no. 1, p. 107 at 112.
13. E. g., E. McGrady, formerly of the United Textile Workers, now conciliator for
the Department of Labor; G. L. Berry, formerly of the Pressmen's Union, now coordinator
for Industrial Cooperation; Samuel Gompers, who as president of the A. F. of L. was
a member of the Council of National Defense during the war; E. E. Clark, once of the
Brotherhood of Railway Conductors, subsequently on the Interstate Commerce Commission;
W. B. Wilson, once of the United Mine Workers, later Secretary of Labor of the United
States.
14. Thus John Mitchell, former president of the United Mine Workers, died leaving an
estate of $250,000. KoPAr.n, ,znr.EuoN L,; LABOR UNI.zoNs (1924) 39.
15. The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, an aristocrat among labor unions, bad
at one period almost converted their union into a business enterprise. Real estate, hotels,
non-union coal mines, and banks were among the ventures encompassed within the
$100,000,000 financial structure which was built up and then collapsd. Fosnrn, Mxis-
S.xAnERs Or LABOR (1927) 221-247; and Proceedings, Special Convention, Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers (June 6 July 21, 1927). For an account of the rise and decline
of the labor bank movement, see REcENT SocrA. TR.N'Ds (1933) vol. IH, 833. See also
PERLnmAn Ax) TArr, HistoRY or LABOR IU THE UrrED STATES (1935) vol. IV, 572-579.
16. See RECENT SocIAn TaEcos (1933) Vol. II, 816 et seq.; U. S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Average Annual Wage and Salary Payments in Ohio 1916 to 1932, Bull. No. 613
(1935) 6-19.
17. The following is an interesting account of the opposition of members to employer-
employee cooperation: "The rank and file of the unions obstinately refused to appreciate
the work of the peace committee (labor leaders and employers). Its advances were keenly
distrusted and its mission looked upon as a scheme to beguile the workers. The leaders,
hobnobbing with millionaires were treated with equal distrust, and unions kept passing
resolutions of censure. . . The matter was studiously kept out of the Federation of
Labor meetings because we feared the issue." White, op. cit. supra note 12 at 113-114.
Whether cooperation or conflict with employers is the better policy; whether rigidity
or flexibility of wage costs is preferable from the point of view of preventing unemployment;
whether labor unions can advance the interests of all workers within a capitalistic economy,
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accepted, but they have even been offered to employers by some union
administrations who thus attempt to protect both employers and employees
from non-union competition.' 8 Where the workers are determined to demand
higher wages or better working conditions, effective action is often forestalled
by the moral exhaustion and loss of strategic position resulting from delay
urged by the leaders; 19 and when a strike is authorized, its termination may
be ordered by union officers at the slightest concession offered by the employers,
even though far short of the terms demanded.20 Strikers are sent back to work
on the promise of subsequent arbitration, an almost unfailing snare.2 1 Often,
and similar questions, while they suggest limitations to the possible achievements of union
action against employers, are beyond the scope of this comment. Our problem concerns
the formulation of policy within unions, a process which should rest upon democratic
choice among alternatives. Inquiry into whether a policy so formulated is desirable on
the one hand, and could be effectuated on the other, however significant for a theory
of the labor problem in general, would carry this comment far beyond the question of
disputes within trade unions.
18. The American Federation of Full Fashioned Hosiery Workers volunteered wage
reductions aggregating 50% over a period of three years. American Federation of Full-
Fashioned Hosiery Workers (Jan. 1932) 5 FORTUNE no. 1, p. 49. "On the falling market
of 1930-1933 the 'flexible' wage policy so greatly extolled by the newer school of union
economists in the later twenties, has proved no more efficacious than the unsophisticated
'No Backward Step' policy of old line unionism?' PRLm= AND TAr, op. cit. svpra
note 15, at 590. Unions often cooperate with employers to speed up production. Partly
as the result of such cooperation employment in the Chicago clothing trade fell trom
26,000 to 14,000 between 1924 and 1929. Id. at 587-588.
19. The strike of the United Mine Workers in 1935 furnishes an illustration in point,
The contract with the operators expired on April 1 and the miners demanded an increase
in wages and a reduction in hours. Although they were anxious to strike, President Lewis,
pending the passage of the Guffey Coal Act, postponed the strike for five months through
a series of truces, thereby permitting the operators to accumulate sufficient supplies "to carry
industry over a tie-up of seven to eight weeks." N. Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1935, at 3, col. 2.
When the strike finally was called, it lasted only six days, "the shortest in the history
of the industry," and the miners, while they won certain wage increases, lost their demand
for shorter hours. N. Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1935, at 1, col. 4. For an account of the delay
technique to defeat rank and file sentiment in the Amalgamated Ass'n of Iron, Steel and
Tin Workers, see Adamic, Steel Strike Collapses (July 4, 1934) 139 NATION 9.
20. For an account of such union leader strike settlements in the clothing trades, so
PERLMAN AND TAFT, op. cit. supra note 15, at 299-317; in the plinting trade, Id. at 457-
460; in bituminous coal, id. at 612-614.
21. Probably the most famous example is the Landis Award in the Chicago building
trades labor dispute in 1921. "In some cases the Landis rates were below those offered by
the contractors .... It also did away with the uniform wage for all skilled trades." PIUIMAI
AND TArr, op. cit. supra note 15, at 507. For an account of the New York Web Premsmen
strike, see KoPALD, REBELLION n LABOR UNIONS (1924) 199 et seq. Striking seamen of
the crew of the S. S. California were induced to end their strike and Sail from San Pedro
by the promise of a "square deal" by Secretary of Labor Perkins. Sixty-four of their
number, however, were fired and blacklisted after the ship reached New York, N. Y.
Times, March 19, 1936, at 27, col. 5; id. April 22, 1936, at 1, col. 2. For an exposition
of the view that governmental intervention in labor disputes can achieve but meager results,
see Mason, The Limits as to Effective Federal Control of the Employer-Employee Rclation.
ship (1936) 84 U. or PA. L. Rxv. 277.
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agreements with employers, embodying terms much less favorable to members
than had been desired, are signed by union officers without consulting their
constituents.2 2  Such unauthorized and unsatisfactory agreements have led to
insurgent strikes which both employers and union leaders attempt to suppressP
Where strikes involve several unions, leaders are prone to make individual
settlements and leave the others in the lurch.
24
Conflicts as to the proper role of labor unions in politics arise as corollaries
to broader differences of view among union men as to the proper policy and
function of unions in modem economic society. The opinion of trade union
officials is similar in both fields: expectation of gains within the existing econ-
omic order is matched by a hope for political progress within the major poli-
tical parties.-5 The leaders of the large unions have steadfastly opposed move-
ments for an independent labor party, and they have been particularly vigilant
to suppress communism.20 The movement for independent political action by
22. "The S. S. California crew struck in Pedro because after two months of negotiations
no agreement had been reached. They returned to work only after a promise had been
made that a satisfactory agreement would be reached soon. While at sea, a new agree-
ment was signed between the Jhip owners and our union officials without the membership's
approval. . . . The new agreement does not provide for overtime pay, union control of
hiring and 8 hour day for stewards-which we want and had previously instructed the
negotiations committee to get." Statement of the striking seamen in New York, April 1936;
Daily Worker, April 1, 1936. See also, KOPAID, R r.zao. n; LAOR UNIONs (1924) 225-
226 for a similar occurrence in the Pressmen's Union; FosrEm, f. n mrEns or Lwmon (1927)
122, 127-128, 134. See also Neal v. Hutcheson, 160 N. Y. Supp. 1007 (Sup. CL 1916)
(local unions suspended because of refusal of members to accept strike settlement which
their president had negotiated without consulting with them, injunction granted retraining
the suspension).
23. For examples of the ruthless strikebreaking tactics utilized by union leaders against
the insurgent fllinois miners' strike of 1919, the "outlaw" rail strike of 1920, the Printers'
Vacation Movement in 1919, and the New York Web Pressmen's strike of 1923 sEe KopAr=,
1,.r.Er.uosr ne LA3OR UNIONS (1924) 100-101.
24. In the steel strike of 1919, President Tighe of the Amalgamated Ass'n of Iron,
Steel, and Tin Workers contributed materially to the loss of the general strike by nego-
tiating a separate agreement covering only the most skilled workers. Fosm, Tim GMT
STExL Sn= oF 1919 (1920) 249-252. For an account of such splitting procezs within
the United Mine Workers in one instance, see Brophy, Elements of a Progre-Tsse Union
Policy, in HA unAxu, AmacAx. L.AOR DYNasncs (1928) 186, at 183-189.
25. See Non-Partisan Declarations, Half Century Political Policy (1931) (pamphlet
published by the A. F. of L.); N. Y. Times, April 12, 1936, at 9, col. 1; id. April 27, 1936,
at 5, col. 4.
26. "When at its Portland 1923 convention, the American Federation of Labor, by a
vote of 27,837 to 108, expelled Win. F. Dunne, one of the foremost communists, the labor
movement officially approved expulsion of communists. . . . Never before in the history
of the labor movement has there been such a wholesale expulsion of members? S,%rozs,
LExr W=G UNloNSM (1926) 55-56. At the last convention of the A. F. of L., the
e-xecutive council sought an amendment to the union's constitution excluding "lcommunists
or any persons espousing communism" from all affiliated unions. The convention finally
adopted an "amendment which excluded such persons, not from an affiliated bodies, but




organized labor, coming mainly from industrial unions, thus far has been gen-
erally defeated by craft union leaders.
27
Racketeering within unions is another problem of trade unionism provoking
frequent litigation. Unlike the more deeply seated schisms, it indicates a
situation requiring immediate attention.28 Racketeering can thrive only where
the union is able to maintain its monopoly of the labor supply, as in the
building trades or the live poultry industry of New York City.2 9 The privilege
of working and the privilege of hiring labor are conditioned upon the payment
of heavy toll by worker and employer to union officials. Attempts by outsiders
to invade the field are met by the familiar methods of gangsterism.30 Never-
theless, the most respectable leaders of the larger unions make no efforts to
eradicate the evil; but join the racketeers in branding as "reds" those members
who wish to clean up the unions.
3
1
27. At the last convention of the A. F. of L., 13 resolutions were introduced advocating
action to establish state and national labor parties. Reported unfavorably by the reqo-
lutions committee, they were all defeated. Proceedings, 55th Convention, A. F. of L. (1935)
758-776.
.28. Although racketeering is not rampant in all unions, apparent basis is given to such
contention by abuses within some unions. See HosTmETrR AND BEEStLy, IT'S A RAMKET
(1929) 29-69. Mr. Hostetter is secretary of the Chicago Employers' Ass'n. See also
PERLmAr AND TArt, op. cit. supra note 15, at 602.
29. See Reister, Report to the Dep't of Public Markets, Weights and Measures, on the
Live Poultry Industry in Greater New York (1935) 81-100; Report of Lockwood Committee
on Housing (1922), N. Y. LwO. Doc. No. 60; Governor Lehman's Special Grand Jury on
Racketeering in New York County, Report in N. Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1935, at 1, col. 8;
Report of Citizens' Committee to Investigate Conditions in the Painters' union, District
Council No. 9, New York City, Prof. Paul Brissenden, Chairman (1935). See also Polin
v. Kaplan, 257 N. Y. 277, 177 N. E. 833 (1931); Kaplan v. Elliott, 145 Misc. 863, 261
N. Y. Supp. 112 (Sup. Ct. 1932); Chalghian v. Int. Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., 114
N. J. Eq. 497, 169 Atl. 327 (Ch. 1933); PEIiAm AND TAFT, op. cit. supra note 15, at 601.
30. See, for example, the criminal records of labor leaders in the New York Poultry
Unions, Reiste¢r, op. cit. supra note 29, at 30-39.
31. Mr. Reister's recommendations to the Department included the following: "Elim-
inate the criminal element from the labor unions by vigorous prosecution, and by forcing
officials of the A. F. of L. to cooperate to this end." Reister, op. cit. supra note 29, at
145. N. Y. City Commissioner of Markets Morgan described his difficulties thus: "The
Department appealed to William Green, president and Matthew Woll, vice-president of
the A. F. of L., urging them in the name of decent American union men to prohibit
Herbert, on his release from prison, from assuming again a position representing the
A. F. of L. in the City of New York. The sum total of results from these appeals was
that on Herbert's return, the members of the union presented him with a $4,000 automobile,
and when he arrived at the live poultry terminal on the New York Central Railroad, a
60-foot sign greeted him with 'Welcome Home Tootsie.'" Annual Report, N. Y. City
Dep't of Public Markets (1935) 18, N. Y. World-Telegram, March 30, 1936, at 6, col. 1;
Philip Zausner, then president of the New York Painters' Union, in a letter to Nathan
Greene, declined to attend the hearings held by the Citizens' Committee to Investigate
Conditions in the Painters' Union, alleging that their worx was at the instance of "sub-
versive" groups within the union. Unpublished transcript of evidence before the Committee
(Prof. Paul Brissenden, Chairman) Sept. 1935, at 33-36. See also Local 11, Int. As'n of
Bridge, etc., Ironworkers v. McKee, 114 N. J. Eq. 555, 169 Atl. 351 (Ch. 1933); Irwin
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The existence of factions and differences of opinion within labor unions is
not to be deplored. On the contrary, such a clash of view and purpose is
essential to the vitality of the democratic process by which union leaders are
supposed to be selected and union policie8 determined. Although union dis-
cipline may be justified only to the extent that it is based upon a democratic
procedure within the union, there are indications that such basis does not always
exist in fact. In the struggles for the attainment and maintenance of leading
positions in the organizations, goals worth striving for because of the central-
ization of authority in the prevailing American type of national ("International")
craft union, the rules of the game are often violated. Those groups which
stand to lose in democratic choice of officers frequently resort to violence and
terror as well as simple fraud to gain or keep their places 32  Positions once
secured are retained within the dominating group by other common devices,
such as highly exclusive union election eligibility rules,33 wholesale use of
powers of appointment,34 packing of conventions,35 or simply the prevention
of new elections.30 Incumbencies in office not uncommonly exceeding thirty
years indicate how closed union official circles are.
3 7
v. Possehl, 143 Misc. 855, 257 N. Y. Supp. 597 (Sup. Ct., 1932), 145 Misc. 907, 261
N. Y. Supp. 164 (Sup. Ct. 1932); KoP.4ID, RErBEmLON 3N L.m0R UNioS (1924) IC-101;
Feinstein, Racketeering in the A. F. of L. (1935) 141 NATioN 28S, 316.
32. E. g., the New York Painters' Union elections of June 1935 were characterized by
"the occurrence of frequent repeating on a large scale, . . . the frequent use of violence
and intimidation .... and, generally, a widespread obliviousness to the provisions for secret
elections," Prof. Paul Brissenden, op. cit. supra note 29, at 27. See also, GLocEn, TaE
Govxim-ar or Aa =acAt R T~aum UNioNs (1913) 234-235; FosTR, ATISLmDEnS OF LAroa
(1927) 291-294; Feinstein, op. cit. supra note 31, at 316.
33. E. g., Defendant's Brief in United States v. Weirton Steel Co., [10 F. Supp. 55, 6-6
(D. Del., 1935)] fied Dec. 29, 1934 pointed out, at pages 212-213, that out of the 3,C00
local members of the Amalgamated Ass'n of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers, only 183 were
eligible to vote in the national union elections, and that President Tighe of that union
was re-elected by less than 3,000 votes out of all the members of the union. Figures on
the total membership of the Amalgamated Ass'n are not available, but it claimed to be
the chief union in an industry employing about 500,000 men.
34. For example, the officials of 15 of the 31 Districts of the United Mline Workers of
America are appointed by the national union officers. Strenuous attempts made by the
so-called "provisional" districts at the 1936 convention of the union to gain autonomy in
the election of their own officers and organizers mct with defeat at the hands of the national
officers. Proceedings, 34th Convention United Mine Workers (1936) vol. I, pp. 49-51, 97-102s
107-133, 206, vol. II, pp. 462-467. See also Myerscough, The Name is Lewis-John L.
(pamphlet, 1934). See Proceedings, 55th Convention of the A. F. of L. (1935) 284-5 for
an account of William Green's repeated appointment of officers for the United Automobile
Workers over the protest of the majority of the convention of that union.
35. At the 1927 Convention of the United Mline Workers, President Lewis had 166
delegates from West Virginia, where the union had only 337 actual members. Fosrzn,
uixAnEs oF LABoR (1927) 290.
36. See Webster v. Rankins, 50 S. W. (2d) 746 (St. Louis Ct. of App., Ao., 1932)
(elections postponed a year); Harris v. Geier, 112 N. J. Eq. 99, 164 Aft. 50 (Ch. 1932)
(local union elections prevented by national officers).
37. Samuel Gompers headed the American Federation of Labor for 38 years; ie
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Similarly, an entrenched officialdom frequently prevent a free discussion of
fundamental policies within unions. Comment which runs counter to the wishes
of the officers is discouraged and criticism of their policies is often ruthlessly
suppressed by athletic use of gavel, 8 red-baiting,8 1 physical violence, 09 or
expulsion from the union.40 When the critical spirit spreads and these methods
prove ineffective to throttle it, meetings may be suspended,41 national conven-
tions passed by,42 and on occasion local unions showing tendencies to be in-
subordinate have even lost their charters from the national body.
43
Tighe has been a high officer in the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin
Workers since 1898, president since 1919; Andrew Fu'ruseth has been at the head of the
International Seamen's Union for 51 years; from 1914 to 1925 there were no change3 In
the membership of the Executive Council of the A. F. of L. P. M. Arthur was Chief of
the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers from 1874-1903. For comment upon the
prevalence of old-age among labor leaders, see Stark, Problems of Labor LeadershIp (1936)
184 ANNALs 199, 204.
38. For examples of suppression of discussion at union conferences and conventions see
N. Y. Times, April 30, 1935, at 6, col. 1; Proceedings, 17th Convention of the Int. Ass'n
of Machinists (1924) 170, where discussion citical of officers' salaries was ended summarily
by the Secretary of the Union, presiding: "I can keep hitting this gavel just as long as
you can keep talking. Don't worry about that."
39. Not long ago, Joseph Casey, California organizer for the A. F. of L. was Jailed for
assaulting the chairman of a progressive caucus of the San Diego Central Labor Council.
Daily Worker, Feb. 10, 1936. Ivan F. Hunter, secretary-treasurer of the International
Seamen's Union is charged with conspiracy to murder two progressive leaders of maritime
unions by offering $500 to another man to do the job. N. Y. World-Telegram, April 7,
1936; Daily Worker, April 19, 1936.
40. See, e. g., Love v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 139 Ark. 375, 215 S, W.
602 (1919) ; Johnson v. Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 52 Nev. 400, 288 Pac. 170
(1930); Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N. Y. 277, 177 N. E. 833 (1931); Gersh v. Ross, 238 App,
Div. 552, 265 N. Y. Supp. 459 (1st Dep't 1933); Shapiro v. Gehlman, 152 Misc. 13, 272
N. Y. Supp. 624 (Sup. Ct., 1934).
41. See Walsche v. Sherlock, 110 N. J. Eq. 223, 237, 159 AtI. 661, 667 (Ch. 1932).
The tendency of the maritime union members to criticize their international union officers
led the New Orleans district committee of the International Seamen's Union to order
suspension of all meetings "until the situation comes back to normalcy." Other cities
saw the same methods applied. In New York only by court order could the membets
of the Marine Firemen, Oilers and Watertenders Union get a meeting. V. Smith, Fight
of Gulf Dockers, Daily Worker, Nov. 16, 1935; see also id. Nov. 23, 1935. On one occasion
G. L. Betry, then president of the Pressmen's union, had 18 members fired from their
jobs for demanding a union meeting. Daily Worker, Nov. 3, 1933.
42. E. g., the recent 1936 convention of the International Seamen's Union was the
first since 1930, although the constitution of the union provides for yearly conventlons
(Art. V, sec. 2), (April 1936) SEAsXEN's JOuRNAL 82. "Almost every International has its
conventions at greater intervals than formerly. A favorite method to eliminate conven-
tions is to make them so costly, by paying the big delegations extravagant per diem
expenses, that the union, with its regular funds, cannot afford them." FosT.R, MlsLr.MinUt
or LABoR (1927) 289.
43. Local 7, Bricklayers', Masons' and Plasterers' Union v. Bowen, 278 Fed. 271 (S. D.
Tex. 1922); Edrington v. Hall, 168 Ga. 484, 148 S. E. 403 (1929); Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Williams, 211 Ky. 638, 277 S. W. 500 (1925); Barbrick v. Huddell, 245 Mass.
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The abuse of authority by leaders destroys in this manner the democratic
process within the union by which union discipline is said to be sanctioned.
But those who differ with union leaders on fundamental policies are severely
punished under the color of those disciplinary rules. Their views are often
suppressed and their voice in the affairs of the union is minimized out of
proportion to their numbers. It is of little practical significance whether this
result flows from "liberal" constructions by leaders of their grants of power
in union constitutions 4 4 from the expansion of officials' powers through the
amendment of union constitutions by unconstitutional means,'5 or simply from
unauthorized exertions of power. In any case conflicts of views cannot be
resolved through the normal procedure for the formation of policy-free dis-
cussion, practical compromise, and unhampered selection of leaders within
unions. On the contrary, penalties are imposed for alleged breaches of union
rules, and then the fundamental disputes are involved only as remote, collateral
issues where the precise problem actually presented to the courts for solution
is the technical validity of particular exertions of disciplinary authority.
Within the labor union structure exist the formal requisites for the solution
of practically all internal difficulties.4 6 There is provision for regular local
428, 139 N. E. 629 (1923); B'icklayers', Plasterers' and Stonemasons' Union v. Bowen,
183 N. Y. Supp. 855 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
44. See, e. g., statement by John L. Lewis uttered at the 1933 Convention of the
American Federation of Labor: "The United Mne Workers are not apologizing for the
provisions of their constitution to my friend Dan Tobin, or anyone else. We give him
the right to interpret his own constitution in the teamsters' union and to run his organ-
ization any way he wants to run it-and we understand he runs it. Frankly and confi-
dentially, we do the same." The Anericamn Federation of Labor (Dec. 1933) 8 Foamu
No. 6, p. 86.
45. The Citizens' Committee to'Investigate Conditions in the Eastern and Gulf Districts
of the International Seamen's Union (Prof. Walter Gellho-n, Chairman, N. Y. 1936) after
a hearing attended by 350 members of local unions, which the officers of these unions
declined to attend, charged, inter alia, that changes in the constitution had been made,
greatly enhancing the power of the executive board, and "That copies of the propoved
revised constitutions were placed in the hands of a small number of members and were
not made available to the membership at large; that in some of the Locals members were
required to ballot on the proposed revised constitutions in the offices of the Union officials,
although the then existing constitutions required balloting to take place in the local
meeting.. . 2' Copy of communication from Committee to the International Seamen's
Union, Jan. 15, 1936.
Revisions in the constitution of the Marine Firemen, Oilers and Watertenders Union
have been attacked in court as unconstitutional by representatives of the memberzhip.
N. Y. Times, April 14, 1936, at 43, col 8. The Supreme Court of New York upheld an
amendment to the constitution of this union adopted by secret vote to place in the hands of
a select group the power to make final decisions as to union policies. The ostensible justi-
fication for this maneuver was the threat of radicals gaining control of the union. O'Hagan
v. Carlson, N. Y. L. J., May 19, 1936, at 2559, coL 3; N. Y. Times, May 19, 1936, at 47, col. 1.
46. See GaocxzR, T Govmuarm or A. imacma; TRADE Uzno.:s (1913); Horx.amrn
AND BAR=, STUDIES nT Aar Zuaui TRADE UnoNM-s (1907) 13-80. U. S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Handbook of American Trade Unions, Bull. No. 505 (1929). The fol-
lowing union constitutions have been consulted: Amalgamated A.s'n of Iron, Steel and Tin
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union meetings as well as for national conventions where issues of general policy
can be worked out. Methods of impeaching officers as well as of expelling
members for violations of union rules are outlined in the constitutions. Written
charges and hearings are prescribed, and there is provided a system of lower
and appellate tribunals, beginning with the local union from which appeal
lies through the national executive board to the convention. Beyond the con-
fines of a single international union, the American Federation of Labor, with
its constituency of 109 "autonomous" national unions and 1,354 federal unions
chartered directly by it,47 seems to provide an ideal framework within which
to achieve some solution for questions of broad labor policy. But neither
tribunals and conventions in the unions, nor the Federation can perform this
function successfully, for they are in their composition parties to the most
important disputes. The tribunals above the local union are composed of officers,
judges in their own cause when their authority is challenged.48 The repre-
sentation at conventions and on the executive council of the Federation exag-
gerates the influence of the conservative craft unions out of proportion to their
numerical strength in all the constituent bodies and those groups are as a
result far removed from membership opinion.
49
Workers, A. F. of L., Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen, Building Trades Dep't of A. F. of L., Cigarmakers' International
Union, Int. Fur Workers' Union, Int. Ladies Garment Workers' Union, Int. Seamen's Union,
Int. Typographical Union, Order of Railway Conductors, United Mine Workers, United
Textile Workers.
47. Proceedings, 55th Convention, A. F. of L. (1935) 29.
48. "The average case before the union boards is argued by an official against an
ordinary member. The official is a public speaker. . . . He can make the boards believe
anything he wants them to believe, because it is a one-sided affair. . . . To testify or hold
an official to account before the administration of justice within the union means numerous
and endless punishments, administered by the [business] Agent and his friends. This Is
the reason why officials are not held to account for their abuses, remain unpunished, even
when their offenses are outrageous and committed quite openly." Kirshenbaum, The Mind
of Organized Labor (pamphlet, 1924).
49. The great majority of delegates to A. F. of L. conventions are high officials In
the unions they represent, for seldom are delegations from any one union larger than two
or three members. The largest delegation at the last Convention of the A. F. of L. was
composed of 8 delegates, all national or district officers of the United Mine Workers. The
following table indicates the weight of representation. (n. b., substantially all the national
and international unions are craft organizations).
Number of Unions Type Number of Delegates Votes
94 National and International 275 29,209
3 Departments 3 3
35 State Bodies 35 39
89 Central Unions 89 89
113 Local and Federal Unions 101 411
3 Fraternal Organizations 4 3
337 507 29,746
Proceedings, 55th Convention, A. F. of L. (1935) viii, xx. See also LORWIN, Tut
A T RcA FEDERAioN or LAOR (1933) 229, 301-330; and notes 3 and 8, supra.
Being without effective remedy elsewhere, union members are therefore com-
pelled in the more flagrant cases to resort to the courts for vindication of
their membership rights.50 Expulsion of members or of locals from their
organizations is by far the most frequent specific grievance for which equitable
relief is sought and often granted.51 The expulsion may be the external mani-
festation of some fundamental inner conflict or merely the penalty justifiably
imposed for a serious violation of union discipline. The reports seldom dis-
tinguish clearly between the two. Other types of equitable relief granted have
been injunction to restrain application of union funds to purposes other than
those for which they were raised, -52 or to prevent the disruption of a local
union by the national organization;5 3 mandatory injunction to enforce the right
of a member to have his name placed upon the union ballot," or to compel
completion of the judicial process within a union;r5 and receivership to manage
a union where there have been serious financial irregularities in its admin-
50. Cases involving disputes within unions have been discussed in legal periodicals as
follows: Chafee, Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit (1930) 43 Htnv. L. Rnv. 993;
.Mintz, Trade Union Abuses (1932) 6 ST. Jon's L. REv. 272; Pound, Equitable Relief
Against Defanation and Injuries to Personality (1916) 29 Hiiv. L. Rev. 640; Steever,
Control of Labor Through Union Discipline (1931) 16 Com. L. Q. 212; Stern, A New
Legal Problem in the Relations of Capital and Labor (1926) 74 U. or PA. L. RP. 523;
Comment (1930) 30 CoL. L. R.v. 847; Comment (1922) 35 H,%v. L. RE%. 332; (1933)
1 I. J-. A. BuLL. no. 10, p. 1; (1933) 2 id. no. 1, p. 3, id. no. 4, p. 7; Comment (1934)
12 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 291; Comment (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1244; (1924) 24 Cor. L. Rn.
551; (1933) 46 Huv. L. RLv. 1037; (1931) 6 Sr. Jonx's L. RlEv. 143; (1933) S id. 159;
(1934) 7 So. CA ir. L. REv. 339; (1932) So U. or PA. L. rfv. 452; (1935) 44 Y u L. J. 1446.
For a recent comment on internal union disputes see (1936) 20 Mlm.x. L. REv. 657.
51. Gardner v. Newbert, 74 Ind. App. 133, 123 N. E. 704 (1920); Snay v. Lovely, 276
Mlass. 159, 176 N. E. 791 (1931); Blek v. Wilson, 262 N. Y. 253, 186 N. E. 692 (1933);
Simpson v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, S3 W. Va. 355, 93 S. E. 530 (1919), cert.
denied, 250 U. S. 644.
52. Howden v. Yorkshire Miners' Ass'n (1903), 1 K. B. 303 (application of funds to
unauthorized strike enjoined).
53. Powell v. United Ass'n of Plumbers, etc., 240 N. Y. 616, 14S N. E. 723 (1925) (in-
junctive relief pending appeal to the union convention). Cf. Howard v. We'ssman, 31 F.
(2d) 639 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929); Barbrick v. Huddell, 245 Mass. 428, 139 N. E. 629 (1923);
Malloy v. Carroll, 272 Mass. 524, 172 N. E. 790 (1930) (national officers held to have no
power to remove local officers). For a series of cases involving the InL Union of Operating
Engineers, in which the court protected the local from dictatorial control by the national
officers, see Rodier v. Huddell, 232 App. Div. 531, 250 N. Y. Supp. 336 (1st Dep't 1931),
Irvin v. Possehl, 143 Misc. 855, 257 N. Y. Supp. 597 (Sup. Ct. 1932) and 145 Misc. 907,
261 N. Y. Supp. 164 (Sup. Ct. 1932), McGrath v. Dillon, 145 Misc. 912, 262 N. Y. Supp. 90
(Sup. Ct. 1932).
54. Williams v. District Executive Board, United Mine Workers, I D. & C. 31 (Pa. 1921).
But see Maloney v. United Mine Workers, 303 Pa. 251, 162 Atl. 225 (1932) (reversing
decree ordering candidate's name to be placed upon ballot).
55. Int. Union of Steam and Operating Engineers, 119 Ohio St. 94, 162 N. E. 386
(1928); Holmes v. Brown, 146 Ga. 402, 91 S. E. 403 (1917) (plaintiff reistated p2nding
lawful trial within union). Cf. Harris v. Geier, 112 N. J. Eq. 99, 164 Atl. 50 (Ch. 1932)
(defendant officers enjoined from interfefing with local's management and preventing an
election)..
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istration 6  Damages at law have also been sought. Since practically all
that these cases put in issue is the propriety of impositions of disciplinary
penalties, the courts can consider only the peripheral aspects of the underlying
differences between rival factions within the union.
At the outset, courts hesitate to interfere in the internal affairs of labor
unions. Under the law applicable to voluntary unincorporated associations not
for profit, from which the principles relevant to disputes within unions have
developed, their managers were permitted wide discretion over internal matters ;"
and even corporate bodies enjoy considerable autonomy on questions of business
policy.59 Likewise, in deference to the requirements of union discipline, courts
are reluctant to interfere with the exercise of authority by union officers, and
in some cases even allow them the conclusive interpretation of the documents
which spell out their powers.60 Thus in many cases arising from the normal
56. Chalghian v. Int. Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., 114 N. J2. Eq. 497, 169 Atl. 327
(Ch. 1933) (bogus local union organized and $50,000 in dues collected by officers of
legitimate union, court appoints custodial receiver-trustee to conserve funds); Local 11,
Int. Ass'n of Bridge, etc., Workers v. McKee, 114 N. J. Eq. 555, 169 AtI. 351 (1933)
(meetings suspended by officers, misappropriations of funds "tantamount to malfeasance,"
etc.) ; Kaplan v. Elliott, N. Y. L. J., Dec. 28, 1932, at 3015, col. 4, id. Jan. 5, 1933, at 57,
col. 1 (Sup. Ct.) (receiver appointed to handle funds of union). For further cases in-
'volving the expulsion of Kaplan, President of the union and charged with mismanagement
of $800,000 of its funds, see Kaplan v. Elliott, 145 Misc. 863, 261 N. Y. Supp. 112 (Sup.
Ct., 1932); 237 App. Div. 877, 261 N. Y. Supp. 975 (1st Dep't 1933); 146 Misc. 400, 263
N. Y. Supp. 50 (Sup. Ct. 1933); 239 App. Div. 914, 265 N. Y. Supp. 952 (1st Dep't 1933).
See Comment (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1244; (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 1037; (Feb. 1933) 1
I. J. A. BULL. no. 10, p. 1.
57. Grand Int. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Green, 210 Ala. 496, 98 So.
569 (1923); Blanchard v. Newark Joint Dist. Council, 77 N. J. L. 389, 71 At. 1131 (Sup.
Ct. 1909) aff'd without opinion, 78 N. J. L. 737, 76 At. 1087 (1910); Blek v. Wilson, 262
N. Y. 253, 186 N. E. 692 (1933) (reinstatement plus damages); Screwmen's Benevolent
Ass'n v. Benson, 76 Tex. 552, 13 S. W. 379 (1890); 2 Tex. Civ. App. 66, 21 S. W. 562
(1893) (mandamus plus damages).
58. See Loubat v. Le Roy, 40 Hun. 546 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1st Dep't 1886) (although
member expelled from the Union Club was finally reinstated on the ground that he did
not have an opportunity to appear and be heard, it was indicated that managers of clubs,
have wide discretion in internal matters), rev'g, 15 Abb. N. C. 1 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1st
Dep't 1884). For a ruling in this case to effect that a member of the investigating com-
mittee cannot be questioned in court as to .the proceedings of that committee, see Loubat
v. Le Roy, 65 How. Pr. 138 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1883). For discussion of the general subject,
see Chafee, Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit (1930) 43 HAav, L, Rtv. 993;
Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamatioii and Injuries to Personality (1916) 29 HAM, L.
REv. 640.
59. See, e. g., United Copper Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U. S. 261 (1917);
Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11 (1872).
60. Such a power, even though exercised in a manner "harsh and drastic on Its face
and decidedly variant from the course of ordinary judicial procedure," has been upheld,
Simpson v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 83 W. Va. 355, 98 S. L. $80 (1919),
cert. denied, 250 U. S. 644 1919). See also Local 76 v. Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners, 143 La. 902, 79 So. 532 (1918) ; Crutcher v. Eastern Division 321, Order of Railway
Conductors, 151 Mo. App. 622, 132 S. W. 307 (1910) (upholding president's interpretation
of the laws of the order to the effect that he had authority to annul the proceedings of a
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routine of union discipline, courts decline to intervene, and will not prevent
the imposition of penalties for strike-breaking; 1 nor upset decisions within the
union regarding seniority rights,c2 or transfer of membership;c0 nor interfere
with the enforcement of union working rules 4 or regulations of apprenticeship.'C
The historic case of Commonwealth v. Hunt"" upheld the imposition of a dis-
ciplinary penalty despite the charge that the union constituted a criminal
conspiracy, and since that case the courts have marked out a considerable
sphere of legitimate union discipline.
0 7
In this type of case, then, the complaining litigant must overcome an excep-
tional inertia on the part of the courts. Since equitable relief is usually
requested, an injured right of property must be shown. The absence of such
a showing has been sufficient to deny the complainant relief even though he
was expelled without notice or hearinges or under rules adopted in a manner
challenged as contrary to the union constitution,c0 or where the existence of a
local union was at stake.70 Even in a suit for reinstatement involving the
recovery of wages lost as the result of a discharge which the union upheld as
justified, the court declined to interfere in the internal affairs of the union
since it held that rights of property were not involved."' In general, however,
local division in case, in his judgment, the proceedings were unlawful, and that he could
do this without attending the local division in person).
61. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Barnhill, 214 Ala. 565, 103 So. 456 (1926)
(court will not interfere with union board's control of strike funds); Monroe v. Colored
Screwmen's Beneficial Association, 135 La. 894, 66 So. 260 (1914); Clark v. Morgan, 271
Mass. 164, 171 N. E. 278 (1930) ; Havens v. King, 221 App. Div. 475, 224 N. Y. Supp. 193
(3d Dep't 1927), aff'd without opinion, 250 N. Y. 617, 166 N. E. 346 (1929).
62. Shaup v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 223 Ala. 202, 135 So. 327 (1931);
Long v. B. & 0. Rr., 155 Md. 265, 141 At. 504 (1928); Ryan v. N. Y. Cent. Rr., 267
Mich. 202, 255 N. W. 365 (1934); Crisler v. Crum, 115 Neb. 375, 213 N. W. 366 (1927);
Burger v. McCarthy, S4 W. Va. 697, 100 S. E. 492 (1919).
63. Pratt v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street and Electric Railway Employees, 50 Utah
472, 167 Pac. 830 (1917).
64. Master Stevedores' Ass'n v. Walsh, 2 Daly 1 (N. Y., 1867) (affirmative enforce-
ment by court of penalty for working for less than union scale); Thomas v. Musical Mutual
Protective Union, 121 N. Y. 45, 24 N. E. 24 (1890); Mullett v. United French Polisiher
London Society, 20 T. L. R. 595 (1904).
65. Muller v. Bricklayers', Masons' and Plasterers' Int. Union, 6 N. J. Misc. 226, 140 At.
424 (Sup. Ct. 1923) (mandamus for admission into union denied).
66. 45 Mass. 111 (1342). For a valuable discussion of the case in the trial court, and
of the considerations of policy governing Judge Shaws reversal of the conviction, sEm
Nelles, Commonwealth v. Hunt (1932) 32 Cor. L. REv. 1128.
67. See Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co., 62 Fed. S03, 817 (C. C. S. D. Ohio,
1894) (although enjoining a sympathetic strike, Judge Taft pointed out a wide area of
permissible union activity).
68. Blek v. Xirkman, 148 Misc. 522, 266 N. Y. Supp. 91 (Sup. Ct., 1933) (motion for
judgment on the pleadings denied, since property right cannot be determined without a
hearing).
69. Hall v. Morrin, 293 S. W. 435 (Mo., St. Louis Ct. of App., 1927).
70. O'Brien v. Musical Mutual Protective and Benevolent Union, Local 14, 64 N. J.
Eq. 525, 54 Atl. 150 (Ch. 1903).
71. Stivers v. Blethen, 124 Wash. 473, 215 Pac. 7 (1923).
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courts have been assiduous to safeguard the significant economic interests
underlying these cases, and where the requirements of equity seemed urgently
to demand intervention, they have not encountered difficulty in finding rights
of property to protect. Thus, the usual system of union insurance benefits,
'
the good will of a local union,73 seniority status,74 often the crucial factor in
obtaining employment, and the right to work 75 have been held property rights
upon numerous occasions. In an unusual case the right to work was held to
be a property right for the purpose of declaring unconstitutional an early
statute which, in order to limit the courts' injunctive power in labor disputes,
had enacted that the employer-employee relationship involved only personal
rights.76  In another significant case, in which defendant printer members of
the International Typographical Union had sought to deprive complainant
mailer members, a minority, of all voice in the affairs of the union, the court
granted appropriate relief.77 The holding on whether a property right of the
mailer members was involved was marked by an appreciation of the realities
underlying the dispute:
"Manifestly, it might prove fruitless or futile, in discussing this case,
to take up seriatim so-called 'rights' of members of any or all of these
organizations with a view to determining whether singly or in the aggregate
they are comprehended within the term 'vested' . . . The court, in
answering the question of fact (whether a 'vested right' is at issue), need
not ascribe to that phase of the matter less importance or less dignity than
the parties ascribe to it. . ....
Beyond this first prerequisite to relief, exhaustion of all "administrative"
remedies provided in the organization must be shown.78  Failure to allege that
72. Gardner v. Newbert, 74 Ind. App. 183, 128 N. E. 704 (1920); Lo Bianco v. Cush-
ing, 117 N. J. Eq. 593, 177 At]. 102 (1935); Fritz v. Knaub, 57 Misc. 405, 103 N. Y. Supp.
1003 (Sup. Ct., 1907).
73. Barbrick v. Huddell, 245 Mass. 428, 139 N. E. 629 (1923).
74. Gregg v. Starks, 188 Ky. 834, 224 S. W. 459 (1920) (enforcement of decision of
Railway Board of Adjustment enjoined as interfering with plaintiff's seniority rights under
collective labor agreement between union and road) See Long v. B. & 0. Rr. Co., 155 Md.
265, 141 Atl. 504 (1928) (seniority right conceded to be a property right for purposes of
argument, but relief denied); Crisler v. Crum, 115 Neb. 375, 213 N. W. 366 (1927). Cf.
Order of Railway Conductors v. Jones, 78 Colo. 80, 239 Pac. 882 (1925). Contra: Ryan
v. N. Y. Central Rr. Co., 267 Mich. 202, 255 N. W. 365 (1934), Burger v. McCarthy, 84
W. Va. 697, 100 S. E. 492 (1919); McMurray v. Brotherhood of Rr. Trainmen, 50 F.
(2d) 968 (W. D. Pa. 1931) (semble).
75. Adair v. United States 208 U. S. 161 (1908) ; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1 (1915);
Brennan v. United Hatters of North America, 73 N. J. L. 729, 65 Atl. 165 (1906).
76. Bogni v. Perotti, 224 Mass. 152, 112 N. E. 853 (1916).
77. Howard v. Weissmann, 31 F. (2d) 689, 693 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929), cert. denied, 280
U. S. 575 (1929).
78. Jennings v. Lee, 295 Fed. 561 (W. D. N. Y. 1923) (expelled local union denied
relief because of failure to use transfer opportunities available within union); Greenwood
v. Building Trades Council of Sacramento, 71 Cal. App. 159, 233 Pac. 823 (1925); HarrIl
v. Detroit Typographical Union, 144 Mich. 422, 108 N. W. 362 (1906); Crisler v. Crum,
115 Neb. 375, 213 N. W. 366 (1927) (seniority dispute); Burger v. McCarthy, 84 W. Va.
697, 100 S. E. 492 (1919) (seniority dispute).
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fact may render the bill defective; 70 and the rule has been applied even though
the remedy, as by appeal to the convention, is far distant in timet 0 This
requirement, however, is sometimes waived where the proceedings in the lower
tribunal of the organization were void for lack of notice or hearing,8 ' where
further appeal within the body would be "a vain form' s-2 or would take too
long,83 where there is obvious pre-judgment of the case in the union's appellate
tribunal,8 4 or where the grievance arose from a situation contravening public
policy.85 Exhaustion of internal remedies has been dispensed with also where
property rights of a local union are jeopardizedO and is not required in suits
for damages
8 7
Jurisdiction of the issues once established, courts regard union constitutions
and the by-laws and resolutions adopted pursuant thereto as "contracts" in
which are defined the rights, duties, and powers of members and leaders
respectively. In a suit for an injunction against the enforcement of a fine,
it was held that failure to allege the by-laws of the union rendered the bill
defective.88 Where the actions of the officers or the proceedings of the appellate
tribunal are within the written rules, they are usually not reviewable by the
courts, either on the merits or to examine the weight of evidencePO Where,
79. Nyland v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 156 La. C03, 100 So.
733 (1924).
80. Mulcahy v. Huddell, 272 Mass. 539, 172 N. E. 796 (1930) (suit for reinstatement
by plaintiff alleging dictatorial control by union president, conventions held quadrennially);
Fritz v. Knaub, 57 Misc. 405, 103 N. Y. Supp 1C03 (Sup. Ct., 1907) (union insurance
policy would lapse before time of appeal to convention). Cf. Local 104, v. Int. Brother-
hood of Boiler Makers, etc., 158 Wash. 4S0, 291 Pac. 328 (1930) (internal remedies would
be too expensive and cause delay in suit on fidelity bond of local officer).
81. McCantz v. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paper Hangers, 13 S. W. (2d)
902 (Te-x. Civ. App., 1929); People ex rel Deverell v. Musical Mutual Protective Union,
118 N. Y. 101, 23 N. E. 129 (1889); Fales v. Musicians' Protective Union, 40 R. I. 34, 99
At]. 823 (1917).
82. Barbrick v. Huddell, 245 Mass. 428, 436, 139 N. E. 629, 632 (1923) (only appeal
was to board whose action is complained of).
83. Fitz v. Knaub, 57 Misc. 405, 103 N. Y. Supp. 1C03 (1907); Local 104 v. Int.
Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 158 Wash. 480, 291 Pac. 328 (1930).
84. Edrington v. Hall, 168 Ga. 484, 148 S. E. 403 (1929).
85. Cameron v. Int. Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, etc., 118 N. J. Eq. 11,
176 At. 692 (1935) (closed shop agreement held an unwarrantable restraint of trade),
noted (1935) 44 YALa L. J. 1446.
86. Harris v. Geier, 112 N. J. Eq. 99, 164 At. 50 (Ch., 1932).
87. Blanchard v. Newark Joint Dist. Council, 77 N. J. L. 389, 71 At]. 1131 (Sup. Ct.,
1909), aff'd without opinion, 78 N. J. L. 737, 76 At. 1037 (1910); Benson v. Screwmen's
Beneficial Ass'n, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 66, 21 S. W. 562 (1893); Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers v. Green, 210 Ala. 496, 98 So. 569 (1923).
88. Engel v. Walsh, 258 IlL 98, 101 N. E. 222 (1913).
89. Elfer v. Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n, 179 La. 383, 154 So. 32 (1934); Snay
v. Lovely, 276 Mass. 159, 176 N. E. 791 (1931) (plaintiff expelled on charge of violating
rule against unauthorized strikes, "the finding of the general executive board was dearly
wrong and was based upon hearsay evidence," but the courts will not sit in reviev., of such
tribunals if their action was based upon "honest error of judgment, an innocent mistake in
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even without opportunity for hearing, members were expelled by a convention
for violating a union rule which prohibited' the issuance of any circulars or
petitions critical of the union administration, judicial remedy was held pre-
cluded by the rule. 0 Forfeiture to the national organization of $2,000 in
funds and property of a local union as a penalty for a ten day unauthorized
strike has likewise been upheld under the rules of the union. 1 Decisions such
as these, restricting members' rights to their "contracts" as found in union
constitutions and subsequently adopted by-laws and resolutions, may be ques-
tioned for carrying too far the analogy from fraternal associations where strict
application of the rules would hardly have such serious consequences. The
implication of assent to organizational rules, upon which the contract theory
is predicated, has far more basis in fact in the case of a social club, where
.,the option of resignation offers a real alternative to compliance with unreason-
able rules, than in the case of a labor union where membership is often the
determinative factor in the obtaining of a livelihood.
92
On the other hand, strict construction of union constitutions and rules often
suffices to protect members from unwarranted exertions of authority, for offi-
cials' powers as well as members' rights are delimited in those "contracts." If
the situation appears to demand judicial intervention, the courts will scrutinize
the union rules minutely for a technical flaw in their interpretation or appli-
cation upon which to base the granting of relief to the wronged member as
where the penalty for the offense was not specifically prescribed, 93 or limited
drawing inferences"); Schouten v. Alpine, 215 N. Y. 225, 109 N. E. 244 (1915) (damages
denied, no bad faith being alleged in decision of tribunal); Shapiro v. Geblman, 152 Misc.
13, 272 N. Y. Supp. 624 (Sup. Ct. 1934), noted (1934) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 291; Mac-
lean v. Workers Union (1929) 1 Ch. 602 (expulsion for issuing circular not approved by
union officers, "a person who joins an association governed by tules under which he may
be expelled ...has ...no legal right to redress if he be expelled according to the rules,
however unfair and unjust the rules or action of the expelling tribunal may be, provided
that it acts in good faith").
90. Love v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 139 Ark. 375, 215 S. W. 602 (1919).
Officials of the state have no such power to suppress criticism. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.
S. 697 (1930).
91. Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen v. Williams, 211 Ky. 638, 277 S. W. 500 (1925),
92. See Harris v. Geier, 112 N. J. Eq. 99, 106, 164 Atl. 50, 53 (Ch., 1932) ("A stock-
holder of a corporation, if dissatisfied with its management, can sell his stock and Invest
elsewhere; a member of a union can resign-and starve.")
93. Burke v. Monumental Division No. 52, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 273
Fed. 707 (D. Md. 1919) (variance between charges against expelled member and the
rule); Local 7, Bricklayers, etc., Union v. Bowen, 278 Fed. 271 (S. D. Tex, 1922); Otto
v. Journeymen Tailors' Union, 75 Cal. 308, 17 Pac. 217 (1888); Int. Ass'n of Machinists v,
Reba, 97 Conn. 235, 116 Atl. 235 (1922) (revocation of local union charter does not carry
with it forfeiture by local of funds in absence of rule to that effect) ; Johnson v. Brother-
hood of Carpenters and Joiners, 52 Nev. 400, 288 Pac. 170 (1930) (charges in union hear-
ing specified no rule violated); Gersh v. Ross, 238 App. Div. 552, 265 N. Y. Supp. 459
(1st Dept. 1933) (variance between charge and rule applied in union), noted (1934)
7 So. CAL. L. REV. 339; Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N. Y. 277, 177 N. E. 833 (1931) (expulsion
for offenses not prescribed in union laws), noted (1932) 80 U. or PA. L. Rav. 452,
(1932) 6 ST. JorN's L. Rav. 143; Weiss v. Musical Mutual Protective Union, 189 Pa.
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construction is given to a rule by distinguishing profit-sharing from shareholding
by a member in the employer's business in order to reinstate the member,04
or, in a dispute as to which of two charters granted at different times is
applicable, that charter is selected under which the property of a local union
may be protected.95
While these decisions refer to "contract rights," the analogy to the law of
contracts is neither persuasive nor complete. It is rarely indicated precisely
who are promisors and promisees, nor is the question of consideration ever at
issue. An alleged breach of union rules does not give rise to a cause of action
sounding in contract, for there must be a showing of a property right apart
from the mere contract of membership. Furthermore, courts do not feel bound
by the terms of the membership contract as spelled out in the union rules, but
consider the significant economic circumstances relevant to the status of trade
union membership in general to support a grant of relief against conduct
expressly authorized in the union constitution or by-laws. Concepts of due
process and natural justice have been incorporated into this branch of the law.
Thus, a by-law permitting expulsion without notice or hearing has been declared
void;98 double jeopardy before a union tribunal will not be permitted;O7 and
the interest of a union tribunal in the outcome of the proceedings has been
held to disqualify it from deciding plaintiff member's rights. 3 In an interesting
series of suits, brought after majority members of a union had sought arbitrarily
to deprive a minority of their voice in the affairs of the union, the first case
was disposed of by requiring adherence to the union rules of procedure, for
the president, in violation of those rules, had overridden a majority of the
executive boardP 9 But when the same unjust result was accomplished by
formally proper methods, the court went further to protect the minority group's
466, 42 At. 11S (1S99) (no offenses made grounds for expulsion in charter of incor-
porated union).
94. Amalgamated Society of Carpenters, etc. v. Braithwaite (1922) 2 A. C. 440.
CL Irwin v. Possehl, 143 Misc. 855, 257 N. Y. Supp. 597 (Sup. Ct. 1932) (powers of
national officers narrowly construed).
95. Moyer v. Butte Miners' Union, 232 Fed. 738 (D. Mont. 1916), 246 Fed. 657
(C. C. A. 9th, 1917), cert. denied, 245 U. S. 671 (1918). Cf. Bachman v. Harrington,
52 Misc. 26, 102 N. Y. Supp. 406 (Sup. Ct. 1906) (penalty for offense stipulated in
1904 constitution, held repealed by 1905 constitution lacking stipulation).
96. Swaine v. Mller, 72 Mlo. App. 446 (1897); Bricklayers', Plasterers', etc. Union
v. Bowen, 183 N. Y. Supp. 855 (Sup. Ct. 1920) (enforcement of expulsion without
written charges enjoined; "in the absence of precise stipulation for notice of and hearing
of complaints, . . . public policy demands that the law intervene to supply such
omission"); Gilmore v. Palmer, 109 Misc. 552, 179 N. Y. Supp. 1 (Sup. CL 1919).
97. Rueb v. Rehder, 24 N. Ml. 534, 174 Pac. 992 (1913).
9S. Local 7, Bricklayers', etc., Union v. Bowen, 278 Fed. 271 (S. D. Tex. 1922);
("No judicial or quasi-judicial hearing is valid where the madxm 'audi alteram partem'
is ignored," hence interest of the union executive board rendered it "disqualified, as a
matter of law, to sit in judgmenL"); Eschman v. Huebner, 226 Ill. App. 537 (1922)
(malicious expulsion gives right to damages); Robinson v. Dahm, 94 Misc. 729, 159
N. Y. Supp. 1053 (Sup. Ct. 1916) (construction of their own powers by union officers
not allowed); Weiss v. Mlusical Mutual Protective Union, 1S9 Pa. 446, 42 Afl. 118 (1899).
99. McNichols v. Int. Typographical Union, 21 F. (2d) 497 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927).
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standing in the union by looking beyond the rules to the realities of the con-
troversy beneath.j °° In another series of cases, the court first annulled a grossly
discriminatory classification of union membership into "juniors" and "seniors", 101
and then went forward to establish the status of the "junior members" as
full-fledged members.
10 2
Furthermore, union discipline may not encroach on public rights and duties
of members, such as freedom to testify before a governmental agency,10 3 to
report violations of law by fellow members, 10 4 to seek a writ preventing improper
diversion of union funds, 05 to vote as one chooses for a public officer, 00 to vote
for a rival union in a labor board election, 0 7 or to petition the legislature.0 "
In these cases courts have revealed a judicious concern for the rights of
union members, protecting the significant economic interests at stake and often
commenting, shocked, upon the situations of autocracy or corruption which
they discovered within a union. 0 9 Unfortunately, however, the courts have not
always limited their review simply to a consideration of the rights of members,
groups, or locals in the unions. They have on occasion undertaken to upset
policy decisions of a majority in a union by designating the minority as
"loyal""10 or by preventing the majority. from altering union by-laws in a
100. Howard v. Weissman, 31 F. (2d) 689 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929), cert. denied, 280
U. S. 575 (1929). See also McNichols v. Int. Typographical Union, 63 F. (2d) 490
(C. C. A. 7th, 1933) (bill charging failure to comply with order in principal case,
dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence).
101. Cameron v. Int. Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, etc., 118 N. J. Eq. 11,
176 Atl. 692 (Ch., 1935), noted (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1446.
102. Cameron v. Int. Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, etc., 183 Atl, 157
(N. J. 1936), cert. denied, U. S. L. Week, April 14, 1936, at 781, col. 3; Collins v.
Int. Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, etc., 182 AtI. 37 (N. J. Ch. 1933) (another
phase of same controversy).
103. Abdon v. Wallace, 95 Ind. App. 604, 165 N. E. 68 (1929) (testifying before
I. C. C., punished by president of Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers); Thompson
v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 176, 91 S. W. 834 (1905)
(testifying in tort suit against railroad company and refusing to promise to union officerq
that he would not do so again).
104. Manning v. Klein, 1 Pa. Super. Ct. 210 (1895) (reporting violation of Sunday
closing law by fellow barber).
105. Parr v. Lancashire and Cheshire Miners' Federation (1913) 1 Ch. 366.
106. Schneider v. Local 60, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers, etc., 116 La, 270,
40 So. 700 (1905).
107. Ray v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 182 Wash. 39, 44 P. (2d) 787 (1935).
108. Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 270 Pa. 67,
113 Atl. 70 (1921), noted (1922) 35 HARv. L. Rxv. 332.
109. "The oppression and exploitation of labor by so-called labor leaders shown by
the evidence in this cause is a thousand-fold worse than that of capitalism which labor
organizations were formed to resist," Walsche v. Sherlock, 110 N. 5. Eq. 223, 159 Atl.
661 (Ch. 1932). See also Abdon v. Wallace, 95 Ind. App. 604, 165 N. E. 68 (1929);
Irvin v. Possehl, 143 Misc. 855, 257 N. Y. Supp. 597 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
110. Martin v. Smith, 286 Mass. 227, 190 N. E. 113 (1934) (this case was part of
the controversy in the International Typographical Union mentioned above, majority
wished to sever connection with mailers' district organization). Cf. Fritz v. Knaub,
57 Misc. 405, 103 N. Y. Supp. 1003 (Sup. Ct. 1907) (member, expelled through regular
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case where there was amlle legal support for the change."' Further, they
have carried into some decisions involving union discipline their individual
economic views, hostile to labor, presented as "public policy." Thus, penalties
for strikebreaking have been held to be against public policy;112 enforcement
of disciplinary measures for working on non-union material has been enjoined;" 13
and rules limiting the number of apprentices" 4 and a resolution not to work
below a certain scale of wages"0 have been voided. Declaration of a boycott
has been enjoined as coercive of union members."10 Even where the result
in a particular case appears entirely just," 7 the social policy on which some
of these decisions are founded carries an implicit threat to all labor organ-
ization. Since union discipline essential to collective action necessarily involves
elements of monopoly and restraint of trade contrary to a "public policy"
conceived purely in terms of laissez faire, the application of the individual
economic theories of the judiciary in these cases is likely to impede effective
union activity.
The possibilities of judicial interference with normal union functions, by
way of litigation between competing factions, appear more imminent with the
increasingly drastic remedies available against unions. Injunctive restraint,
mandatory injunction, and receivership may result in a far greater degree of
judicial supervision than the normal order of reinstatement. In this connection,
two cases are instructive. The first involved a glass makers' union of 6,000
members which, at the instance of a disgruntled faction within the union was
entirely dissolved by court order and for whose funds of more than $100,000
a receiver was appointed, on the grounds that it constituted a labor monopoly
in restraint of trade and contrary to public policy." 8  In the second, a lower
procedure by large majority of local union, reinstated after court looked into evidence
on charge in the union).
111. Flaherty v. Portland Longshoremen's Beneficial Society, 99 Me. 253, 59 At. 58
(1904) (resolution to provide for a doctor out of union funds).
112. Willicut & Sons Co. v. Driscoll, 200 Mass. 110, 85 N. E. 897 (1903); People
ex rel. Doyle v. N. Y. Beneficial Society of Operative Masons, 3 Hun. 361 (N. Y. 1875).
In Froelich v. Musicians' Mutual Beneficial Ass'n, 93 Mo. App. 383 (1902), the plaintiff,
expelled for riding on a street car during a trolley strike, was denied reinstatement
under the defense interposed by the union that it was an illegal association! But cf.,
Jetton-Dekle Lumber Co. v. Mather, 53 Fla. 969, 43 So. 590 (1907) (strike injunction,
but union permitted to enforce its rules against its members); New England Wood Heel
Co. v. Nolan, 26S Mass. 191, 167 N. E. 323 (1929) (strike injunction, but union di-
cipline allowed).
113. Purvis v. Local 500, Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 214 Pa. 348, 63
Atl. 585 (1906). But cf. Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582 (1917).
114. Kealey v. Faulkner, IS Ohio Dec. 498 (1907). But cf. Long:hore Printing Co.
v. Howell, 26 Ore. 527, 38 Pac. 547 (1894) (union apprentice regulation and general
discipline broadly upheld).
115. Graf v. Master Horseshoers' Protective Ass'n, 15 Ohio Dec. IS (1904). But
cf. Barker Painting Co. v. Brotherhood of Painters, etc., 23 F. (2d) 743 (Ct. of App.,
D. C. 1927).
116. Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq. 101, 30 At. 881 (Ch., 1894).
117. See Cameron v. lot. Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, etc., 118 N. J.
Eq. 11, 176 AUt. 692 (1935), noted (1935) 44 Y=nn L. J. 1446.
118. Kealey v. Faulkner, 18 Ohio Dec. 498 (1907).
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chancery court, at the behest of certain employers, appointed a receiver for a
union during a strike in order to tie up the union funds. The receiver
appointed was a sales agent for the petitioning employers.11 Upon appeal,
however, a writ of prohibition was issued against the chancellor below, prevent-
ing continuance of the receivership on the somewhat narrow ground that equity
will not by an original action take jurisdiction of a suit involving unliquidated
damages arising from a tort, that is, alleged destruction of company property
during the strike.120  While in the recent cases of flagrant financial corruption
within unions the remedy of receivership seems appropriate, the threat of its
unwarranted extension is real. It may be pertinent in this connection to recall
the development of the labor injunction from early cases involving protection
from actual violence for physical property, often when specially protected in
the hands of receivers previously appointed by the court for some other
purpose.1 2 1  As the labor injunction was molded by the judges, respectful of
property and averse to disorder, it changed from an extraordinary remedy
to an almost unfailing fetter upon effective strike activity.122 Attempts are
being made to check this trend of judicial decision by the enactment of
federal 23 and state' 24 statutes limiting the injunctive powers of courts in labor
119. Communication to the YALE LAw JOURNAL from Mr. G. L. Grant, Counsel for
United Mine Workers, April 9, 1936.
120. District 21, United Mine Workers v. Bourland, 169 Ark. 796, 277 S. W. 546
(1925).
121. Injunctions against strikes were natural when the property was in custodia legis.
See United States v. Kane, 23 Fed. 748 (D. Colo., 1885); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.
v. Northern Pac. Rr. Co., 60 Fed. 803 (E. D. Wis., 1894). Cf. In re Cleveland &
Sandusky Brewing Co., 11 F. Supp. 198 (N. D. Ohio, 1935) (Norris-La Guardia Act
held not to prevent issuance of labor injunction where employer was in course of re-
organization under 77B), noted (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 372, (1935) 49 HAR. L. RInv. 341.
The transition to cases in which receivership was not involved was easy. See Casey v,
Cincinnati Typographical Union No. 3, 45 Fed. 135 (S. D. Ohio, 1891); Coeur d'Alene
Consolidated & Mining Co. v. Miners' Union, 51 Fed. 260 (D. Idaho, 1892); Blindell
v. Hagan, 54 Fed. 40 (E. D. La., 1893). See also Nelles, A Strike and its Legal Con-
sequences (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 507, 532.
122. See Fitmx-uRTE AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTIOX (1930) 23, 82-133; Wir-rE,
THE GOVERNMrENT ul LABOR DIsPuTEs (1932) 83-133, and cases cited therein.
123. 38 STAT. 738 (1914), 29 U. S. C. A. § 52 (1926) (Clayton Act); 47 STAT. 70
(1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 101 (1935) (The Norris-La Guardia Anti-Injunction Act).
While there is some doubt as to the constitutionality of the latter statute, to date It
has been upheld in the lower courts. Cinderella Theater Co. v. Sign Writers' Local
Union No. 591, 6 F. Supp. 164 (E. D. Mich., 1934) (injunction refused and statute held
not to violate due process clause); Miller Parlor Furniture Co., Inc. v. Furniture Worlers'
Industrial Union, 8 F. Supp. 209 (D. N. J., 1934) (injunction denied); United Electric
Co. v. Rice, 80 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935) (act held not to preclude injunction
where there was a dispute between two rival unions as well as between employees and
employer), noted (1936) 45 YAE L. J. 1320. See Brissenden, The Labor Injunction (1933) 48
PoL. Sd. Q. 413; Christ, Federal Anti-Injunction Bill (1932) 26 IL,. L. REv. 516; Frankfurter
and Greene, Congressional Power over the Labor Injunction (1931) 31 Cor, L. Ray. 389;
Witte, Federal Anti-Injunction Act (1932) 16 Mxn. L. Rnv. 638.
124. Colo. Laws 1933, c. 59; Idaho Laws 1933, c. 215; IIL. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd,
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disputes. The labor injunction, however, in its typical form restricted only
the policies of unions with respect to outsiders. Supervisory intervention in
internal union affairs added to the limitation of injunctions on union activity
may appreciably narrow the permissible scope of collective labor action.
In view of the history of the labor injunction it is not surprising that trade
union members and leaders regard with disfavor any sort of court supervision,
even though aimed at the eradication of admitted abuses to be found within
the organizations,1m  especially because judicial remedies are so thoroughly
incapable of dealing effectively with the problems of domestic conflict and
injustice at issue. At most the function of the courts, reviewing internal union
disputes is to keep the contestants within their own rules and to apply elemental
standards of fairness and justice. While the remedies of equity are sufficiently
flexible from a technical point of view to provide relief in a variety of situations,
in internal affairs unions must be permitted a large measure of autonomy and
their leaders, broad discretion. Courts may properly interfere only in the
most flagrant cases of injustice and autocracy.
Nor is it likely that an administrative agency could adequately cope with
internal union disputes arising from deep-seated conflicts of interest. While
capable of greater flexibility of procedure and adaptability of remedy than the
courts, administrative boards could hardly impose from without the delicate
adjustments and compromises essential for the resolution of such internal dis-
putes on matters of union policy. The National Labor Relations Board has
recognized this practical limitation upon its power, and, although the statute
under which it derives its authority is silent on this point,120 the Board has
so far definitely eschewed the assumption of jurisdiction over conflicts within
unions. The Board has held that its field is delimited to disputes between
employers and employees and has stated as its policy:
1935) c. 48, § 2a; Ind. Acts 1933, c. 12; La. Acts 1934, no. 203; Mle. Laws 1933, c. 261;
Almm. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1936 § 4260; N. Y. Civ. PR.Ac. Acr (1935) §9 876-a, 882-a;
ORE. CODE Ax. (1935) § 49-1901; PA. STAT. A."r. (Purdon, Supp. 193S) c. 7, §R 202-5;
Wis. STAT. (1931) § 268-23; Wyo. Laws 1933, c. 37. The constitutionality of these
state anti-injunction statutes, like the federal statute, is not dear. Dehan v. Hotel and
Restaurant Employees, 159 So. 637 (La., 1935) (statute upheld); Fenake Bros. v.
Upholsters' Int. Union, 353 Ill. 239, 193 N. E. 112 (1934) (statute held constitutional) ;
Opinion of the justices, 275 Mass. 580, 176 N. E. 649 (1931) (proposed anti-injunction
statute declared invalid); Opinion of the justices, 86 N. H. 597, 166 AUt. 640 (1934)
(proposed anti-injunction statute held unconstitutional). Cf. Bogni v. Perotti, 224 Mass.
152, 112 N. E. 853 (1916). See Legis. (1935) 22 VA. L. Rnv. 83.
125. Samuel Gompers, questioned by the N. Y. Lockwood Committee on Housing
(1922) as to judicial remedies for abuses in the building trades unions, replied, "God
save labor from the courts." Excerpts from testimony, published by League for Industrial
Rights (1922). Mr. Louis Weinstock, one of the members attempting to clean up the
New York Painters' Union, told the Citizens' Committee investigating that union that
he had "no confidence in judges that are issuing injunctions against labor organizations
and from this point of view, I believe if we can avoid court supervision at labor union
elections, then we should have no supervision... :" Transcript of testimony, unpublished
(Aug. 19, 1935) 16-17.
126. National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 449-457 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 151-
166 (1935). See Legis. (1935) 35 Cot. L. REv. 1098; Comment (1936) 30 Ix L. Rv. 8SM.
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". .. that the Board should not interfere with the internal affairs of
labor organizations. Self-organization of employees implies a policy of
self-management. . . . In its permanent operation the (National Labor
Relations) Act envisages cohesive organizations, well constructed and
intelligently guided. Such organizations will not develop if they are led
to look elsewhere for the solutions to such problems." 5 7
A minor reform that might prove effective to check one abuse of union
administration-racketeering-would be to require labor unions to register and
file periodical financial statements with some central authority. This policy
has been adopted with respect to political parties in this country 28 and labor
unions in Great Britain129 and appears to offer a feasible method of dealing
with financial irregularities within unions without imposing undue burdens upon
labor activities.
Fundamental solutions to the problems underlying disputes within unions can
come only from action in the ranks of labor itself. While there have always
been protests against the autocracy of leadership and against policies deemed
by many members contrary to their interests, progressive members have achieved
significant successes only where coherent organization has given force and con-
tinuity to their action. Within the American Federation of Labor, for example,
the Committee for Industrial Organization, composed of leaders supported by
the membership of eight important national organizations, is carrying on a
drive for industrial unionism which despite unceasing resistance by craft union
leaders promises to have far-reaching consequences. 130  Racketeering and cor-
ruption of the most extreme character has been practically eliminated from the
127. In the Matter of Aluminum Company of America and Aluminum Workers Union
No. 19104, N. L. R. B. Case R-4, April 10, 1936. The case arose on a petition'of a
local union to deal directly with the company rather than through officials appointed
by the A. F. of L. The Board concluded that "the real question is therefore who
represents and speaks for the Alcoa Union and not whether that Union represents a
majority of the employees at Alcoa," and that "such a question . . . can best be
decided by the parties themselves." N. Y. Times, April 13, 1936, at 36, col. 2. Sub-
sequent decisions of the Board have followed this policy. In the Matter of The Axton-
Fisher Tobacco Company and Int. Ass'n of Machinists, Local No. 681 and Tobacco
Workers' Int. Union, Local No. 16, etc., cases No. R-5 and R-6 (April 23, 1936) and
In the Matter of Standard Oil Company of California and Int. Ass'n of Oil Field,
Gas Well and Refinery Workers, Case No. XXI-R-3 (April 23, 1936) which were juris.
dictional disputes "involving the question of whether such groups of employees . . .
should be organized by the American Federation of Labor upon a 'craft' basis or upon
a 'semi-industrial' basis."
128. The federal government and practically all the states require that political
candidates and/or parties file statements of campaign contributions and expenses, See,
e. g., 36 STAT. 823 (1910), 37 STAT. 25 (1911), 43 STAT. 1071 (1925), 2 U. S. C. A. § 244
(1926); MASS. ANN. LAws (Lawyers Co-op., 1923) c. 55, § 16; Mxcx. Comp. LAWS
(1929) § 3309; NEv. Coup. LAws (H-illyer, 1929) § 2605; N. Y. ELECTroN LAw (1922)
§ 321; Onio GmN. CODE: (Page, 1926) § 5175-2; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 25,
§ 1010.
129. THE TADE UmoN AcT, 1871, 34 & 35 Vict. c. 31, § 16.
130. In the steel industry, for example, the Committee for Industrial Organization has
offered to contribute $500,000 to a campaign of organization to be conducted by the
A. F. of L., on the conditions that (1) "organization must be along industrial lines;"
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New York Painters' Union by the action of the members aided by a citizens'
committee whose investigation gave publicity to the facts. In that contest
only the union officials, resisting the reforms, appealed to the courts for relief,
and their appeal was unsuccessful.'13
Perhaps the most significant example of sustained revolt by union members
against conservative official policies in the formulation of which they have had
very little voice may be found in the maritime unions. Commencing with the
longshoremen's strike in San Francisco in 1934, which resulted in increased
wage rates and union control of hiring halls,1 32 the influence of the rank and
file, led by Harry Bridges, has spread rapidly to the Gulf and Atlantic ports,
where working conditions are far less satisfactory than in Pacific ports.-1
Although these steps have been vigorously resisted by the international union
officials, by the revocation of union charters 34 and, in one case, by an appeal
for an injunction against an unauthorized strike,13 5 the movement of revolt,
behind able leadership supported by substantial numbers, grows apace31
Only a procedure developed by union members themselves is appropriate
for resolving the conflicts of interest and of policy which arise within unions.
Courts may provide supplementary remedies in flagrant cases, but neither they
nor administrative bodies could adequately solve fundamental dissensions on
matters of union policy. The instances of action by union membership and
progressive leadership in the labor movement, cited above, indicate the possi-
bilities of such action from within in influencing the formulation of official union
policy. WrLIAM W. STAFFORDj
and (2) "the leadership of the campaign must be such as to inspire confidence of succCe:.'
Union News Service, Feb. 24, 1936. This offer will be acted upon at the next convention
of the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers, April 28. Union News
Service, April 20, 1936. See also N. Y. Herald-Tribune, May 9, 1936, at 1, col. 5.
131. N. Y. Times, April 2, 1936, at 13, col. 2; id. May 6, 1936, at 45, col. 1.
132. Duanne, The Great San Francisco General Strike (pamphlet 1934); Seeley, San
Francisco's Labor War (1934) 138 NATIov 672.
133. Daily Worker, March 5, 1936; id. March 25, 1936; id. April 13, 1936; New
York Times, Dec. 31, 1935, at 33, col. 1; id. Jan. 1, 1936, at 51, col. 1.
For a series of articles by Russell B. Porter on the outlaw seamen's strikes in the Atlantic
and Gulf ports, see N. Y. Times, May 14, 1936, at 19, col. 3; id. May 15, 1936, at 4,
ol. 4; id. May 16, 1936, at 5, col. 2; id. May 17, 1936, at 29 col. 2.
134. (April 1, 1936) Sr an's Jou. A. (Convention Issue), 101-102; Daily Worker,
March 25, 1936.
135. N. Y. Times, April 28, 1936, at 43, col. 6.
136. The democracy which exists within the Maritime Federation might account to
some degree for its strength. In this connection, the following excerpt from the mem-
orandum of charges sent to Senator McAdoo, alleging a conspiracy of shipowners to
destroy the West Coast unions, is quite relevant: "It is a peculiarity of Pacific Coast
Maritime Unions that officials must submit every action of the slightest importance to
a majority vote of the membership. And that is precisely what the owners object to.
They do not like democracy. They profess admiration for the Atlantic Coast Maritime
Unions, where the members have absolutely nothing to say as to the functions of their
own organizations." Daily Worker Jan. 28, 1936. Cf. N. Y. Evening Journal, April
17, 1936, at 9, col. 2.
tMember of the second year class, Yale Law School.
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A CONNECTICUT MODIFICATION OF THE UNIFORM TRUST
RECEIPTS ACT
As FACILITIES for financing the transmission and processing of goods have
developed during the last half-century, a security device has emerged known
as the trust receipt, the function of which is to preserve to the financer a secur-
ity interest in the goods involved. Its advent has been attended by considerable
litigation concerning its validity and the extent of the protection it affords. The
courts have tended to limit the use of this device to certain types of transactions,
and even in those transactions it has not met with uniform treatment. 1 In
order to eliminate this lack of uniformity so far as possible, and to authorize
the use of the trust receipt in fields previously denied to it, a Uniform Trust
Receipts Act was drafted. It was approved by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1933,2 and has since been adopted
in California, Illinois, Indiana, New York and Oregon.8 Connecticut has re-
cently taken a rather surprising step in adopting a small part of the Act in
greatly modified form.4  The purpose of this Comment is to compare the pro-
visions and effects of the Uniform Act with those of the Connecticut Act.
TnE UNiFoum AcT
The discussion of the Uniform Act will be directed first to its effect on the
status of the trust receipt in those types of transactions in which the courts
had previously accorded it some degree of effectiveness as a security device,
and secondly, to the operation of the Act in authorizing the use of the trust
receipt in new types of transactions.
1. Tripartite Transactions. Prior to the Uniform Act, the types of trans-
actions in which the trust receipt could be effectively used necessarily involved
three parties-a seller of goods, a financer, and a buyer-since the courts
generally refused to give effect to the trust receipt unless the financer received
"title" to the goods directly from the seller rather than from the buyer.5 One
such tri-partite transaction frequently occurs in the financing of the shipment,
storage, processing and sale of imported goods. The three parties involved are
a foreign seller, a bank, and an importer. The transaction usually proceeds
according to this pattern: the importer arranges with his bank for a letter of
1. For general discussions of the cases, see Bacon, A Trust Receipt Transaction (1936)
5 FORD. L. REv. 17; Frederick, The Trust Receipt as Security (1922) 22 CoL. L. Rtv. 395,
546; Hanna, Trust Receipts (1929) 29 COL. L. Rav. 545; Hanna, Trust Receipts (1931)
19 CArxIF. L. REv. 257; Void, Trust Receipt Security in Financing of Sales (1930) 15 CORN.
L. Q. 543.
2. Handbook of National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1933) 123.
3. Cal. Stat. 1935, c. 716; ILL. REv. STAT. (1935) c. 140 a, §§ 13-34; Ind. Acts 1935,
c. 206; N. Y. PEas. PROP. LAW (1934) §§ 50-581; ORE. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1935) §§
63-(1401-1421). For a discussion of the Illinois statute, see Bogert, The Effect of the
Trust Receipts Act (1935) 3 U. or Cnr. L. Ray. 26.
4. CoNir. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1935) § 1574c.
5. In re 'A. E. Fountain, 282 Fed. 816 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922); Keystone Finance Corp.
v. Kruger, 17 F. (2d) 904 (C. C. A. 3d, 1927); Jordan v. Federal Trust Co., 296 Fed.
738 (D. Mass. 1924); Arena v. Bank of Italy, 194 Cal. 195, 228 Pac. 441 (1924).
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credit authorizing the foreign seller to draw on the bank against merchandise
shipped; the foreign seller ships the goods, making out bills of lading to the
bank; upon the arrival of these bills, the bank indorses them to the importer,
taking in exchange a trust receipt, signed by the importer. The trust receipt
recites that possession of the bills of lading (and hence of the goods) is given
to the importer for a limited purpose, such as shipping, storing, or processing,
with a view towards ultimate sale. The trust receipt further recites that the
bills of lading and the goods held thereunder or the proceeds resulting from
their sale are and continue to be the property of the bank as security until
the advances are repaid, and that the bank may at any time resume possession.0
The effectiveness of the trust receipt as a security device in transactions
of this nature has been established with considerable precision without the
aid of statute. The first question which arises is whether the security interest
of the bank in the goods, documents, or proceeds will be recognized as against
creditors of the importer in the event of his insolvency. Since the bank has
given up possession and since its interest or lien is secret, courts have, in
order to uphold the bank's interest, been forced to distinguish this from similar
transactions. Thus the ordinary pledge, which would fail because the bank
has lost possession, and the customary chattel mortgage, which would be invalid
because of failure to record, are distinguished from the trust receipt on the
ground that in the trust receipt transaction, title passes from the seller directly
to the bank and hence the importer is not in a position to pledge7 or mortgage.,
Again, the trust receipt is distinguished from a conditional sale, where lack of
recordation would also prove fatal, on the theory that the bank is not in the
business of selling goods.9 Whether such distinctions in form are valid or
capable of further refinement seems unimportant since the majority of courts
have upheld the transaction as sui generis, simply recognizing that it is of
great commercial benefit, and that public recordation is unnecessary and would
prove sufficiently expensive and inconvenient to destroy the utility of the device2 0
But a few of the inland states have refused to recognize the bank's interest
because of a statutory or judicial policy against secret liens."1
6. For details of the importing transaction, see Century Throwing Co. v. Muller, 197
Fed. 252 (C. C. A. 3d, 1912); Bacon, loc. cit. supra note 1.
7. Moo-s v. Wyman, 146 Mass. 60, 15 N. E. 104 (1888); Drexel v. Pease, 133 N. Y.
129, 30 N. E. 732 (1892); see Frederick, supra note 1, at 399. But see Hanna, Trust
Receipts (1929) 29 CoL. L. REv. 545, 550.
8. Peoples National Bank v. Mulholland, 224 Mass. 448, 113 N. E. 365 (1916) and
the same case, 228 Mass. 152, 117 N. E. 46 (1917). But see 1 WI uamonJ, S.uxs (2d ed.
1924) §§ 338a-338b.
9. Charavay & Bodvin v. York Silk Mfg. Co., 170 Fed. 819 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1909).
But see New Haven Wire Co. Cases, 57 Conn. 352, 18 At. 266 (1888) (called a condi-
tional sale which at the time did not need to be recorded).
10. In re Cattus, 183 Fed. 733 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910); Century Throwing Co. v. Muller,
197 Fed. 252 (C. C. A. 3d, 1912); In re Marks, 222 Fed. 52 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915); In re
Dunlap Carpet Co., 206 Fed. 726 (E. D. Pa. 1913); Downing Co. v. Shavmut Corp.,
245 Mlass. 106, 139 N. E. 525 (1923).
11. In re Richheimer, 221 Fed. 16 (C. C. A. 7th, 1915) (Illinois); In re Bettman-
Johnson Co., 250 Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918) (Ohio).
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The Uniform Act' 2 adopts the majority rule and protects the bank's interest
against the importer's creditors; but in order to minimize the objections to
secret liens, it limits the protection against lien creditors to a thirty day period
unless the bank complies with certain filing requirements, in which case the
bank is protected for a year, with a privilege of obtaining further protection
by refiling.' 3 The filing provisions are designed to cause a minimum of expense
and inconvenience by requiring only a general filing, one of which may cover
a series of transactions between the importer and the bank taking place within
a year.'
4
A second problem arising in the importing transaction concerns the degree
of protection afforded the bank as against those who purchase the goods or
documents representing the goods from the importer. For clarity, it will be
necessary to treat separately purchasers of goods, mortgagees and pledgees
(who come within the definition of "purchasers" in the Act),'5 and purchasers
of negotiable and non-negotiable documents.
Before the Act, the bank's interest was not protected against the purchaser
of the goods for new value in the ordinary course of trade, at least in those
cases where the trust receipt provided that the importer had power to sell
the goods.'0 Where limitations were placed upon the importer's power of sale,
customary rules of agency were applied." The Act merely codifies the existing
law. Thus the Act provides that the purchaser of goods for new value in the
ordinary course of trade takes free of the bank's interest where the importer
has a power of sale, regardless of whether or not there has been filing.18
The Act also provides that no limitation on the power of sale is effective unles s
the purchaser actually knows of the limitation, 0 and further, that consent of
12. The Uniform Trust Receipts Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, will be cited
as U. T. R. A.
13. U. T. R. A. §§ 8, 13(4). The bank's interest in the goods is protected against
all creditors except lien creditors who become such after the 30-day period without notice
of such interest and before filing. An assignee folr the benefit of creditors, a receiver,
and a trustee in bankruptcy stand in the position of a lien creditor unless prior to the
acquisition of notice by all creditors filing has occurred or the bank has taken possession.
In referring to creditors in the text, it is assumed that the creditor is a lien creditor without
notice, ol" one who stands in the position of such a lien creditor.
Where the importer has disposed of the goods and received payment, the bank Is entitled
to identifiable proceeds, and to all proceeds up to the amount of its claim whether
identifiable or not if receivership or bankruptcy follow within ten days of the sale. Id.
§ 10. If the goods have been sold and payment has not been received, the bank' i
subrogated to the rights of the importer against the buyer. Id. § 9 (3).
14. Id. § 13. The filing provisions Yequire a description of the kind or kinds of goods
covered or to be covered by the financing. The filing fee is one dollar. Repossession is
given the same effect as filing. Id. § 7 (2).
15. "A pledgee, mortgagee or other claimant of a security interest created by contract
is, insofar as concerns his specific security, a purchaser and not a creditor." Id. § 1.
16. Brown Bros. & Co. v. William Clark Co., 22 R. I. 36, 46 At]. 239 (1900). But see
Farmers & Mechanics' National Bank of Buffalo v. Logan, 74 N. Y. 568 (1878). Wheyre
goods were sold in satisfaction of a debt, the bank could recover the goods from the
purchaser. Canadian Bank of Commerce v. Baum, 187 Pa. 48, 40 Atl. 975 (1898).
17. See infra notes 42, 43. 18. U. T. R. A. § 9 (2) (a) (i).
19. Id. § 9 (2) (a) (ii).
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the bank to the placing of goods in the importer's stock in trade or sales room
has the effect of granting liberty of sale,20 even in the event of filing.
Prior to the Act, the bank's interest was protected 2 1 if the importer pledged
or mortgaged the goods except where the importer had a power of sale and
a factors act was in effect, in which case the importer could cut off the bank's
interest by a pledge or mortgage.2 2  Under the Act, mortgagees and pledgees
are treated as purchasers not in the ordinary course of trade,2 whose interest
is subject to that of the bank except where there has been no filing, and where
they have taken possession of the goods.2 4  Because of the requirement of
possession, mortgagees at least would rarely take free of the bank's lien within
this exception. This result would seem to be contrary to that reached under a
factors act where the importer has the power of sale.2 2  With this exception,
then, the bank's protection under the Act against mortgagees and pledgees of
goods is similar to that before the Act.
Nor does the Act appear to alter materially the protection afforded the bank
in transactions involving negotiable and non-negotiable documents. Prior to
the Act, if the bills of lading which the bank handed over to the importer were
negotiable, the importer could cut off the bank's interest by selling them to
an innocent purchaser2 5 or by pledging them to an innocent lender.2  The
Act specifically provides that nothing in the Act shall change the existing law
in regard to negotiable documents.2 7  However, the Act is less clear when
non-negotiable documents are involved, and seems to have omitted entirely any
mention of purchasers of non-negotiable documents,281 an omission which appears
particularly unfortunate since there is apparently a dearth of case law on the
point. Pledgees or mortgagees of non-negotiable documents take subject to
the bank's interest under the Act;2 9 a similar result was reached prior to
the Act.30
20. Id. § 9 (2) (c).
21. Moors v. Kidder, 106 N. Y. 32, 12 N. E. 818 (1887). A different result was
reached when negotiable warehouse receipts were pledged. New York Security & Trust
Co. v. Lipman, 157 N. Y. 551, 52 N. E. 595 (1899).
22. International Trust Co. v. Webster National Bank, 258 Mass. 17, 154 N. E. 330 (1926).
23. U.T.R.A. §§ 1, 9.
24. U. T. R. A. § 9 (2) (b). New value must be given during the first 30 days, and
value after the 30 days to permit the mortgagee or pledgee to come under this exception.
25. Baker Co. v. Brown, 214 Mass. 196, 100 N. E. 1025 (1913).
26. Commercial National Bank of New Orleans v. Canal-Louisiana Bank and Trust
Company, 239 U. S. 520 (1915); New York Security & Trust Co. v. Lipman, 157 N. Y.
551, 52 N. E. 595 (1899); Arbuthnot, Lathan & Co. v. Richheimer & Co., 139 La. 793,
72 So. 251 (1916).
27. U. T. R. A. § 9 (1) (a). Compare Federal Bills of Lading Act, 39 ST,. 544
(1916), 49 U. S. C. A. § 117 (1926); Uniform Bills of Lading Act § 38; Uniform Ware-
house Receipts Act § 40; supra, notes 25, 26.
28. Section 9 (2) (a) (i) of the Act seems to refer solely to the sale of goods but
probably will be interpreted to include non-negotiable documents, particularly where the
holder has the power of sale. Cf. Commercial National Bank v. Bemis, 177 Mass. 95,
58 N. E. 476 (1900).
29. Id. § 9 (2) (b). This would not be true where the pledgee or mortgagee obtained
possession of the goods.
30. Moors v. Kidder, 106 N. Y. 32, 12 N. E. 818 (1887).
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A third problem under the Uniform Act is the protection to be afforded the
bank against warehousemen who have stored the goods for the importer or
processers who have enhanced the value of the goods for the importer in order
to make them saleable. The Act, by providing that the bank takes subject
to the warehouseman's or processer's lien,31 clarifies the existing case law on
the subject.
32
In general, then, it may be said that with the exception of the filing pro-
visions, the Act does little more than clarify and codify the existing law on
the tripartite transaction as it is used in the storing, shipping, processing and
sale of imports.
A second type of three-party transaction in which the use of the trust receipt
has been sanctioned by the courts in the absence of statute to a lesser extent
is the financing of purchases made by dealers from domestic manufacturers
pending resale by the dealers. The field in which such transactions most
frequently occur is the automobile industry. With the tremendous growth in
this industry, the finance companies, which have to a great extent taken over
the bank's function in the financing of the purchase of automobiles from
manufacturers, have turned to the trust receipt device for security. The trust
receipt was selected to avoid the expense and inconvenience resulting from the
necessity of recording chattel mortgages and conditional sales. The expense
of recording each individual transaction would be prohibitive"3 and the in-
convenience resulting from such requirements as the actual publication of notice
on the door of the dealer's display room would be undesirable.
3 4
Before the Act, the protection given to the finance company's interest against
creditors of, and purchasers from the dealer in this domestic transaction differed
from the protection given to the bank's interest in the importing transaction.
The case law as to the protection of the finance company against the dealer's
creditors is far from uniform. Courts, in refusing to recognize the finance
company's secret lien have felt that it was an improper use of the trust receipt 85
or violated a fixed policy against secret liens of any kind.8 0 Other courts have
31. U. T. R. A. § 11.
32. In Massachusetts, the cases applied the rule adopted in the Act. Moors v. Wyman,
146 Mass. 60, 15 N. E. 104 (1888); Downing v. Shawmut Corp., 245 Mass. 106, 139 N. E.
525 (1923). Contra: Century Throwing Co. v. Muller, 197 Fed. 252 (C. C. A. 3d, 1912)
(throwster's lien held invalid).
33. In Hanna, Trust Receipts (1931) 19 CALIF. L. RaV. 257, 274, it is stated that at
least one large finance company prefers to take the risk of insolvency of the deale'r rather
than to undergo the expense of recording.
34. In In re Cullen, 282 Fed. 902 (D. Md. 1922), the court states that "At the hearing
the learned counsel for the [finance company] frankly admitted that the trust receipt
was taken, instead of a chattel mortgage or a recorded conditional sales contract, because
the [dealer] in common with other dealers preferred to keep from the public the facts
that the cars in his garage had not been paid for."
35. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Callahan, 271 Mass, 556, 171 N, E, 820
(1930); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Berry, 86 N. H. 280, 167 Adt, 553 (1933).
36. Industrial Finance Corp. v. Cappleman, 284 Fed. 8 (C. C. A. 4th, 1922); General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Kline, 78 F. (2d) 618 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935); In re Cullen,
282 Fed. 902 (D. Md. 1922); Habegger v. Skalk, 140 Kan. 166, 34 P. (2d) 113 (1934);
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found valid business reasons for upholding such an unrecorded lien. T Not
only has there been conflict between the states, but diversity of decisions within
a state has not been unknown. In Ohio, for example, a bank's security interest
has been held void as against creditors in an importing transaction on the
ground that the state's conditional sales act was broad enough to cover the
trust receipt transaction.38 Subsequently, an act providing for the general filing
of trust receipts was passed,39 but automobiles were held not to be "readily
marketable goods" within the meaning of the act.40 Finally, the finance com-
pany's interest was held to be valid when the trust receipt had been recorded
as a conditional sale.
41
The law prior to the Act regarding the protection of the finance company
against purchasers was somewhat more uniform than in the case of creditors.
Since purchasers of automobiles in the ordinary course of trade usually buy
from the dealer's showroom, the purchaser was allowed to keep the automobile
as against the finance company even though there were limitations on the
dealer's authority to sell, either because the transaction fell within the factors
act,4 or because the doctrine of equitable estoppel applied,4 s or because the
transaction was treated as an unrecorded chattel mortgage4 or conditional sale.45
Nevertheless, in regard to purchasers not in the ordinary course of trade, that
is, mortgagees and pledgees, courts were not in agreement as to whether the
finance company's interest was to be protected40
Smith v. Commerdal Credit Corp., 113 N. J. Eq. 12, 165 At. 637 (Ch. 1933), aifd sub
nom. Morrow v. Smith, 115 N. J. Eq. 310, 170 At. 607 (1934); General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Bettes, 57 S. W. (2d) 263 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
37. In re James, Inc., 30 F. (2d) 555 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929); In re Bell Motor Co.,
45 F. (2d) 19 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930), cert. denied, 283 U. S. 832 (1931); Houck v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 44 F. (2d) 410 (W. D. Pa. 1930); Armstrong v. Greenwich
'Moto"s Corp., 116 Conn. 487, 165 AtI. 589 (1933).
38. In re Bettman-johnson Co., 250 Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918).
39. Omo Gr-i. CoDE ANz. (Page 1926) § 856S.
40. Central Acceptance Corp. v. Lynch, 58 F. (2d) 915 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932).
41. In re Collinwood Motor Sales, 72 F. (2d) 137 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934).
42. Handy v. Commercial Investment Trust Corp., 197 N. E. 64 (Maus. 1935); Clarl.
v. Flynn, 120 Misc. 474, 199 N. Y. Supp. 583 (Sup. Ct. 1923); Capital Motor Corp. v.
Laskelr, 138 Va. 630, 123 S. E. 376 (1924).
43. Glass v. Continental Guaranty Corp., 81 Fla. 687, 88 So. 376 (1921); Common-
wealth Finance Corp. v. Schutt, 97 N. J. L. 225, 116 At]. 722 (1922); Jones v. Commercial
Investment Trust Corp., 64 Utah 151, 228 Pac. 896 (1924).
44. New England Auto Investment Corp. v. St. Germaine, 45 R. I. 225, 121 At. 393
(1923).
45. White v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 2 F. Supp. 406 (D. Ky. 1932) (invalid
as against creditors).
46. The finance company has been protected against a mortgagee. People' Loan &
Investment Co. v. Commercial Credit Co., 75 F. (2d) 545 (C. C. A. 8th, 193S); General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hupfer, 113 Neb. 228, 202 N. W. 627 (1925); Commercial
Credit Co. v. Schlegel-Storseth, 23 S. W. (2d) 702 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) (consideration
for mortgage was preexisting debt). Contra: Motor Bankers' Corp. v. Commercial Invect-
ment Trust Corp., 258 Mich. 301, 241 N. W. 911 (1932); General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Boddker, 274 S. W. 1016 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
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Since the Act treats this domestic transaction just as it treats the importing
transaction, what has already been said concerning the effect of the Act on the
importing transaction applies here. 47 That the two transactions should be
treated similarly seems reasonable, although the reasons for the use of the trust
receipt in the processing of raw imports and in the sale of domestic manu-
factured goods may be different. 48 Certainly it is clear that in the domestic
transaction the Act is particularly necessary to bring order out of considerable
conflict.
2. Bipartite Transactions. As has previously been indicated, the trust re-
ceipt was denied recognition prior to the Uniform Act unless the financer
received title to the goods directly from the seller, and the device afforded no
protection to the financer in a bi-partite transaction between him and the buyer
alone. This was equally true in both the importing and domestic transactions.
49
The reason for this requirement was that when the buyer had received title
from the seller before borrowing from the financer, the transaction between the
buyer and the financer was indistinguishable from an imperfect pledge ° or an
unrecorded chattel mortgage,5 1 and that unless the distinction was observed,
the trust receipt could be used to preserve a secret lien and would virtually
destroy the public recordation policy.
5 2
The insistence by the courts on this formal requisite often led to undesirable
results. For example, since it was a vital necessity for the validity of the trust
receipt that the seller make out the bills of lading to the order of the financer,
or to bearer followed by delivery to the financer, rather than to the buyer's
order, a careless mistake in this regard would destroy the financer's protection."'
Furthermore, uncertainty was sometimes created by the difficulty of ascertain-
ing from whom the finance company received its title to the goods. This was
particularly true in the domestic transaction where the bills of lading with
the draft attached were sent to the local bank which might be an agent for
the manufacturer. The finance company would then supply the dealer with
funds to allow him to get the bills of lading. Unless it was clear that the bills
of lading were to the order of the finance company, or, if the bills of lading
were to the seller's own order, that the documents were delivered to the finance
company or its agent, the transaction was invalid.
5 4
47. U. T. R. A. § 9 (2). The purchase price must be new value. Cf. Commercial
Acceptance Trust v. Bailey, 87 Cal. App. 117, 261 Pac. 743 (1927), where the purchase
price was an antecedent debt, and the finance company was denied 'recovery.
48. The necessity of specifying the goods in a chattel mortgage or conditional sale
makes the trust receipt peculiarly appropriate in the case of raw materials to be processed
and otherwise changed in form and substance.
49. In re Schuttig, 1 F. (2d) 443 (D. N. J. 1924); Peoples National Bank v. Mulholland,
224 Mass. 448, 113 N. E. 365 (1916), and the same case, 228 Mass. 152, 117 N. E. 46 (1917).
50. In re Alday Motor Co., 50 F. (2d) 228 (D. Tenn. 1930).
51. In re A. E. Fountain, 282 Fed. 816 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922); In re Schuttig, 1 F. (2d)
443 (D. N. 3. 1924).
52. In re A. E. Fountain, 282 Fed. 816 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922).
53. Peoples National Bank v. Mulholland, 224 Mass. 448, 113 N. E. 365 (1916), and
the same case, 228 Mass. 152, 117 N. E. 46 (1917).
54. In re Alday Motor Co., 50 F. (2d) 228 (D. Tenn. 1930).
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pe of the declared purposes of the Act is to do away with such difficulties,17
ad therefore the Act provides that delivery of the goods or documents to the
)rrower may be made by the lender or any third person and that the security
aterest of the lender may be derived from anyone."n Thus, under the Act the
;ransaction may be strictly bipartite. That the trust receipt in this case is
indistinguishable from an invalid pledge or unrecorded chattel mortgage is
recognized, 57 and the Act provides that filing or recordation may be made at
the lender's option under any applicable actP However, the framers of the
Act felt it necessary to prevent the extension of the use of the trust receipt too
far into the field previously covered by the law of pledges, chattel mortgages,
and conditional sales. Accordingly, several rather complex limitations are placed
by the Act on the use of the trust receipt. First, the lender cannot be a person
in the business of selling the goods.59 This attempts to prevent a manufacturer
from financing the dealer in a field previously covered by conditional saics.
However, since the manufacturer may set up a subsidiary finance company,
an established practice in the automobile industry, the distinction seems largely
formal.60
Second, the security interest of the financer is only valid when the giving
of a trust receipt results in either an increase in the assets of the dealer or
the return to the dealer of assets already pledged.0 1 These requirements are
apparently designed to prevent the rights of existing creditors from being
adversely affected 
2
Perhaps the most effective of the restrictions imposed on the use of the trust
receipt in the bipartite transaction is the provision limiting its use to certain
purposes. Thus, the trust receipt may be used only in financing the sale of
goods or documents, 63 or the storing, shipping or processing of the goods look-
55. "The present draft continues the prior policy of seeking to free trust receipt
transactions of certain artificial formal characteristics which threatened invalidity for purely
formal error." Handbook of National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (1933) 241.
56. U. T. R. A. § 2 (1) (a); id. § 2 (1) next to last sentence.
57. Handbook of National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(1933) 249.
58. U. T. R. A. § 16.
59. Id. § 1 excludes "A person in the business of selling goods or instruments for profit,
who at the outset of the transaction has, as against the buyer, general property in such
goods or instruments, and who sells the same to the buyer on credit, retaining title or
other security interest under a purchase money mortgage or conditional sales contract or
otherwise....2
60. For example, General Motors Acceptance Corporation is a wholly owned subidiary
of General Motors Corporation. Poor's Industrials (1935) 2110. And in 1934 Chrysler
Corporation acquired a large interest in Commercial Credit Company. Id. at 1041.
61. U. T. R. A. § 2 (1). The increase in assets may be in the form of goods or docu-
ments which are delivered to him or in the form of deposit currency or cas when he merely
exhibits documents which he already possesses. See also U. T. R. A. § 14.
62. The filing provisions elsewhere discussed would seem to be for the benefit of future
creditors as contrasted with existing creditors who would be affected by the creation of
a preference as to existing assets of the dealer in favor of the trust receipt holder.
63. U. T. R. A. § 2 (3) (a).
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ing toward ultimate sale.64 It is therefore not available for financing purchases
by the ultimate consumer.
But despite the foregoing limitations on the use of the trust receipt, it is
nevertheless available in a substantial number of bipartite transactions. Thus,
a dealer in the possession of warehouse receipts representing certain goods may
wish to borrow money. Merely by exhibiting the warehouse receipts to the
bank, the dealer may give the bank a valid security interest in the documents
on signing a trust receipt against the loan.65 Again, if a dealer in second-hand
cars has a number of them in his possession upon which he wishes to borrow
money, he may validly use a trust receipt under the Act by temporarily ware-
housing the cars, exhibiting the documents to the lender, and signing a trust
receipt against the loan.66 Or if a dealer who has previously pledged ware-
house receipts to a bank wishes to get possession of them in order to sell the
goods, he may do so without destroying the bank's security interest by signing
a trust receipt.67 Accordingly, the trust receipt can be used in importing and
domestic transactions under circumstances where it was formerly ineffective be-
cause of the court's insistence on compliance with the formality that the seller,
not the buyer, be the source of the lender's title to the goods.
Furthermore, once the distinction between bipartite and tripartite transactions
is removed, the possibility of extending the trust receipt device to transactions
involving various types of instruments previously covered by the law of pledges
is apparent. The Act therefore provides that instruments such as bills, notes,
stocks and bonds may be the subject matter of a valid trust receipt transaction,
subject to the same limitations as in the cases of goods and documents.08
A number of uses of the trust receipt with respect to bills, notes and accept-
ances are possible. Central or correspondent banks particularly which are hold-
ing instruments as pledgees may use the trust receipt as a security device when
they redeliver the instruments to the pledgor for the purpose of presentation,
renewal and collection.69 However, the use of the trust receipt in this situation
would seem to do little else than serve as a make-weight, since under existing
case law the pledgor may give up possession for such a purpose without loss
64. Id. § 2 (3) (b).
65. Id. § (1) (b). "Documents" were not included in this section of the Uniform
Act, the omission being due to an error by the draftsman. See Handbook of National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1933) 255. But the Untfo~m Act has
been amended in all five states to include them.
66. Id. § 2 (1) (b). The formality of warehousing the goods and then exhibiting
the documents is obviated in some states by providing that the lender can obtain a valid
security interest by lending "in reliance upon the transfer by the trustee to such entruster
of a security interest in goods or documents in possession of the trustee and the possession of
which is retained by the trustee. . . ." Cal. Stat. 1935, c. 716, § 3014 (1) (c); ILL. Rav.
STAT. (1935) c. 140a, paragraph 13, § 2 (1) (c) ; Ind. Acts 1935, c. 206, §%2 (1) (c).
67. Id. § 2 (1) (a). This has been held to be a valid trust receipt-itransaction under
the Louisiana Code. Canal-Commercial Trust & Savings v. N. 0. T. & M. Ry. Co.,
161 La. 1051, 109 So. 834 (1926).
68. Id. § 2.
69. Id. § 2 (3) (c). Trust receipts have previously been used in this connection. See
Hanna, Trust Receipts (1929) 29 Cor.. L. REv. 545, 551.
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of his security interest.70 The Act provides specifically for this transaction, but
since there is no provision for filing in regard to trust receipts covering in-
struments,71 and since the protection exists only for 30 days in the absenqe of
filing, the bank would be protected only for 30 days. However, this protection
would probably be adequate since it would seem that such transactions would
be completed within the 30-day period.72 Other uses of the trust receipt covering
bills, notes, and acceptances are possible under the terms of the Act since the
trust receipt may be used to permit the borrower's possession of the instru-
ments in order to sell or exchange them.73
The Act proxides that corporate securities may be the subject matter of valid
trust receipt transactions. 74 To a certain extent, agreements very similar in
wording to the trust receipt used in the importing transaction have been used
prior to the Act in dealing with corporate securities. For example, in the
ordinary broker's day loan, which is practically an overdraft privilege, the
broker signs an instrument whereby he agrees to use the money loaned to
purchase securities which he contemplates delivering to other brokers or cus-
tomers, and before the close of the banking day, to repay the loan with the
proceeds of the securities obtained or to return the securities them-celves.75
In the absence of statute, the bank's right even to the identifiable proceeds was
doubtful.7 In New York, however, an amendment to the Lien Law was
passed,77 under which it has been held that the bank is entitled to the identifiable
proceeds. 78 Under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, the bank may retain a
valid security interest by taking a trust receipt,70 and is amply protected against
the broker's creditors because the Act permits the bank to recover upon demand
all r-oceeds whether identifiable or not for a ten day period after the loan,
which in this case is a one day transaction.80
There are other ways in which corporate securities may be the subject matter
of a trust receipt under the Act. In a collateral or street loan, where the
70. Clark v. Iselin, 88 U. S. 360 (1874); Stockyards National Bank of St. Paul v. Fihst
National Bank of Towner, 249 Fed. 421 (C. C. A. sth, 1918); Bundy v. Commercial Credit
Corp., 202 N. C. 604, 163 S. E. 676 (1932). The Uniform Act, however, would make it
unnecessary to identify the proceeds for ten days. U. T. R. A. § 10.
71. "Any entruster undertaking or contemplating trust receipt transactions with refer-
ence to documents or goods is entitled to Me. . . " U. T. R. A. § 13 (1).
72. See Handbook of National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(1929) 206.
73. U.T.R.A.§2 (3) (a).
74. Id. § 2. The definition of instrument includes "any certificate of stock, or bond
or debenture for the payment of money issued by a public or private corporation as part
of a selies. .. !' Id. § 1.
75. Such an instrument is set out in In re PerpalI, 261 Fed. 858, 859 (C. C. A. 2d,
1919).
76. Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 231 U. S. 50 (1913).
77. N. Y. Lien Law (1916) § 230.
78. In re Perpal, 261 Fed. 858 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919); Irving Trust Co. v. Bank of America
Nat. Ass'n, 68 F. (2d) 887 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
79. For the validity of such transactions, see U. T. R. A. § 2; Djorup, Uniform Trtut
Receipts Law with Annotations, 18 Acceptance Bulletin, March 1936, p. 1.
80. U. T. R. A. § 10.
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broker in an active market may wish to withdraw collateral from the bank
in order to substitute other securities, he may do so under a trust receipt.8
Another use is possible in the financing of sales of securities between under-
writer and dealer, much in the manner in which automobile sales are financed.81
The Act also provides for transactions involving the delivery of securities to
a depository or registrar in a corporate reorganization. 82 But since the Act
is comparatively new in the states which have adopted it, little use of it has
yet been made in transactions involving corporate securities.
Because of the extension of the Act into pledge law, it was necessary to
round out the codification by providing for agreements to pledge not accom-
panied by delivery which do not fulfill the requirements of a trust receipt
transaction.8 3  At common law it is generally stated that possession by the
pledgee is necessary for a valid pledge;8 4 however, in certain cases where a
loan has been made in good faith in reliance on an agreement to pledge, courts
will treat the agreement as giving rise to an equitable lien, relating the pledge
back to the date of the agreement. This has been done to avoid having a
pledge set aside as a voidable preference where actual delivery took place within
four months of bankruptcy.85 Because this doctrine has not been clearly defined
and because it was felt that in certain cases it permitted fraudulent preferences,"0
the Act clarifies and limits its use by providing that the agreement to pledge
or equitable lien under it shall be valid as against creditors for only ten days",
and that after ten days the pledge shall be effective only against lien creditors
who became such after the delivery, without relation back.88 The Act follows
the common law and permits innocent purchasers to take free of the equitable
lien arising under an agreement to pledge.
89
The effects of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act may be summarized briefly.
It codifies and clarifies the law concerning the tripartite type of transaction
used in the financing of imported goods and in the financing of domestic manu-
factured goods, and adds filing requirements. It makes valid the use of the
trust receipt in bipartite transactions involving not only imported and domestic
goods, but also bills of exchange, notes, and corporate securities. This expan-
sion of the use of trust receipts together with the limitations which have been
imposed thereon result in a highly technical and complex Act.
81. Id. § 2 (1) (a); Djorup, loc. cit. supra note 79.
82. U. T. R. A. § 2 (3) (c). 83. Id. § 3.
84. In re Shulman, 206 Fed. 129 (E. D. Pa. 1913); In re Herkimer Mills Co,, 39 F. (2d)
625 (N. D. N. Y. 1930); Sunbury Finance Co. v. Boyd Motor Co., 180 Atl. 103 (Super.
Ct. Pa., 1935); see JONES, COLLATERAL SEcuRITms, PLEDoES (3d ed. 1912) § 23.
85. Sexton v. Kessler, 225 U. S. 90 (1912); Burrowes v. Nimocks, 35 F. (2d) 152 (C.
C. A. 4th, 1929); In re Goodhue Motor Co., 28 F. (2d) 402 (D. Md. 1928); cf. Irving
Trust Co. v. Commercial Factors Corporation, 68 F. (2d) 864 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934); Irving
Trust Co. v. Lindner & Bros, Inc., 264 N. Y. 165, 190 N. E. 332 (1934).
86. Handbook of National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1929)
207.
87. U. T. R. A. § 3 (1) (a). 88. Id. § 3 (1) (b).
89. Id. § 3 (2). This was true prior to the Act. Robertson v. Wade, 68 S. W. (2d) 487




Perhaps it is the length, complexity and all-inclusiveness of the Uniform
Act which led the Connecticut legislature to adopt the Act in greatly modified
form, even though such action would seem to defeat the principal purpose of
the uniform laws. The Act, as adopted in Connecticut, merely provides that
"the provisions of each trust receipt, pursuant to which goods, merchandise
or other chattels are or may be held for the purpose of manufacture, processing,
storing, shipping or sale, shall be valid between the parties thereto and if the
statement in accordance with subsection (b) 00 hereof shall have been filed,
such provisions shall also be valid as against all third persons, except purchasers
at retail sale for new value who act in good faith and without knowledge of
any limitations contained in any such trust receipt."'O
A comparison of this Act with the Uniform Act reveals several significant
differences and various omissions from the Connecticut Act of an important
nature, resulting in one case in unfortunate ambiguity.
One difference between the two statutes concerns their respective filing re-
quirements. The Connecticut Act, unlike the Uniform Act, does not allow the
lender a period of grace in which his security interest is valid as against third
persons without filing, and hence affords him complete protection only if he
files simultaneously with the making of the loan. The Uniform Act, in per-
mitting the thirty day period of grace, appears preferable. For it seems
reasonable to allow the lender some leeway in filing, and to permit him to
avoid filing altogether in transactions which are completed in thirty days, since
in transactions of such short duration, the chances that third persons will be
misled are at a minimum.92
A second difference between the two statutes lies in the scope of the pro-
tection afforded the lender against third persons. Under the Connecticut Act,
the lender's security interest is protected against all persons except purchasers
at retail sale for new value. This coincides with the protection afforded by
the Uniform Act so far as unsecured creditors of the borrower are concerned,
but is considerably broader than the latter Act in its effect on third persons
of other classes. Thus, the Connecticut Act gives the lender greater protection
against purchasers in the ordinary course of trade than the Uniform Act
3
For example, a shoe manufacturer who purchases tanned hides which are sub-
ject to a trust receipt lien without knowing of that lien, would take clear of
it under the Uniform Act, but under the Connecticut Act, he would not be a
purchaser at retail sale and hence would take subject to the lien. In this
regard, the Connecticut Act appears to violate accepted principles of public
policy which would demand the protection of all purchasers for new value in
90. Subsection (b) is § 13 of the U. T. R. A. which sets forth the mechanics of filing.
91. Co-ur. G N. STAT. (Supp. 1935) § 1574c.
92. See the Report of the Committee on the Uniform Receipts Act. Handbook of National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws (1933) 242.
93. Section 1 of the Uniform Act defines a buyer in the ordinary course of trade as
"a person to whom goods are sold and delivered for new value and who acts in good
faith and without actual knowledge of any limitation on the trustee's liberty of sale...."
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the ordinary course of trade in order to facilitate the free flow of commerce0 4
Again, the Connecticut Act protects the holder of a trust receipt against a
processer's or warehouseman's lien, whereas his interest would be inferior to
such liens under the Uniform Act.05 Here also the Connecticut Act is vulner-
able to criticism, under the usual theory that both the processer and the
warehouseman contribute to the value of the goods, and hence should be given
priority. 96
Numerous important sections of the Uniform Act are omitted entirely from
the Connecticut statute thus leaving unanswered such questions as the lender's
right to proceeds derived from the sale of the goods 7 and his rights on default
by the borrowerY8 An interesting problem might arise as to whether the
Connecticut courts would look to the Uniform Act for the answer to these
questions and thus adopt for Connecticut various sections omitted by the
Connecticut legislature.
Perhaps the most important omission in the Connecticut Act is Section 2
of the Uniform Act which defines a trust receipt transaction and makes valid
the bipartite transaction. The Connecticut Act does not contain any such
definition and thus unfortunately leaves ambiguous the validity of a two-party
transaction*. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the legislature in-
tended to adopt the definition which has been employed by the Connecticut
courts. This definition apparently excludes the bipartite transaction. Thus,
early in the history of the trust receipt, the Connecticut court had occasion
to pass on the validity of the bank's security interest as against creditors of
the insolvent importer. The court upheld the bank's interest, calling the
customary tripartite transaction a conditional sale, which at that time did not
need to be recorded.0 9 The court distinguished the trust receipt from a chattel
mortgage on the ground that the bills of lading attached to it were to the
order of the bank. Likewise, in a more recent case, the Connecticut court
upheld the finance company's interest under a trust receipt as against the
creditors of an insolvent automobile dealer.'0 0 The court expressly did not
decide whether it was a conditional sale or a consignment, since it had been
recorded as a conditional sale. But because of Connecticut's settled rule that
retention of possession of personal property by a mortgagor makes the mortgage
invalid even when recorded as against attacking creditors,' 0 ' the court was
94. Thus in Connecticut an innocent purchaseY in the ordinary course of trade Is usually
protected as against a chattel mortgagee or conditional vendor. Bickart v. Sanditz, 10
Conn. 766, 136 Atl. 580 (1927); O'Loughlin v. Jennings Co., 107 Conn. 369, 140 Atl.
758 (1928). An interesting question would arise where the borrower with a power of gale
sold to a wholesale purchaser. No provision is made in the Act for such a contingency,
95. See supra, p. 1276.
96. This would seem to be the policy expressed in New Britain Real Estate .& Title Co.
v. Collington, 102 Conn. 652, 129 AUt. 780 (1925), where the lien of a repairman who
had enhanced the value of a car was held superior to a conditional vendor's right to retake
possession.
97. U.T.R.A.§ 10. 98. Id. § 6.
99. New Haven Wire Co. Cases, 57 Conn. 352, 18 At. 266 (1888).
100. Armstrong v. Greenwich Motors Corp., 116 Conn. 487, 165 At. 598 (1933).
101. Adler v. The Ammerman Furniture Company, 100 Conn. 223, 123 Atl. 268 (1924).
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compelled to distinguish between a chattel mortgage and a trust receipt. The
court said, "the distinction between the two lies in the fact that, in the case
of a chattel mortgage, the title or lien passes directly from the debtor to the
mortgagee, while in the case of a true trust receipt it passes from the seller
to the lender as security for the debt of a third person, the receiptor." 0 2
Accordingly, if the legislature intended to adopt the common law definition
in the Act, bipartite transactions would apparently be excluded from the scope
of its operation. Such a result seems undesirable. For if the use of the trust
receipt in the bipartite transaction is permitted, unnecessary formalities as to
the source of the lender's title are avoided, and the device can be used to
advantage in situations where it would otherwise be unavailable. The chief
argument against permitting such an extension is that it would inject the trust
receipt into the fields of the chattel mortgage and conditional sale. This
argument, however, does not appear particularly persuasive, for it is based
largely on the fear that the public recordation policy will be destroyed-an
apprehension which seems groundless. In the first place, if the Uniform Act
were adopted, the bipartite transaction could only be used where the borrower
intends to resell the goods. This limits its use to borrowers whose creditors
would derive but little benefit from any form of recordation, since they would
depend largely upon credit agencies, financial statements and personal integrity
rather than apparent stocks of goods. And whatever benefit creditors would
receive as a result of being put on notice would be achieved by a general filing
equally as well as by individual recording.' 03 Nor would the substitution of
the trust receipt for the conditional sale or chattel mortgage appear to alter
unjustly the relative rights of the lender and third persons. Creditors would
find themselves in but little better position were a chattel mortgage 0  or con-
ditional sale0 0 used rather than a trust receipt. The only difference would
result from the fact that in Connecticut an attaching creditor may take clear
of a chattel mortgage interest, 00 a rule with which the policy inherent in
the present Connecticut Act can hardly be said to accord. And innocent pur-
chasers in the ordinary course of trade would take free of the lender's interest
regardless of whether such interest was derived from a conditional sale, chattel
mortgage or trust receipt.1or Therefore, there seems little danger in extending
the use of the trust receipt to the bipartite transaction, and it appears unfor-
102. Armstrong v. Greenwich Motors Corp., 116 Conn. 437, 492, 169 Aft. 59S, CCO (1933).
103. The reason given for allowing the secret lien to be valid in the importing trans-
action is that those who deal with the importer are aware of the general practice; there-
fore it is maintained that in a more extensive field, filing will allow those dealing with the
borrower to be aware of the general practice. See Report of the Committee on the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act. Handbook of National Conference of Commioners on Uniform
State Laws (1933) 123.
104. Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act § 35.
105. Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 5.
106. Adler v. The Ammerman Furniture Company, 100 Conn. 223, 123 Atl. 26S (1924).
107. Bickait v. Sanditz, 105 Conn. 766, 136 At]. 5S0 (1927); O'Loughlin v. Jennings Co.,
107 Conn. 363, 140 AUt. 758 (1928). Compare Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 9; Uni-
form Chattel Mortgage Act § 18; Uniform Trust Receipts Act § 9.
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tunate that the Connecticut legislature did not provide clearly for such an
extension.
In summary, the present Connecticut Act may be criticized not only because
it violates the principle of uniform legislation but because it is incomplete,
ambiguous, too liberal in its protection of the lender, and probably too restricted
in the scope it gives to the use of the trust receipt. The Uniform Act, in spite
of its complexities, seems preferable. Nevertheless, the mere fact that the
Connecticut Act was adopted demonstrates that the Uniform Act is not entirely
satisfactory, and indicates that some clarification and simplification may be
necessary if it is to receive wide acceptance.
